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I Did My Time: The Transformation of
Indiana’s Expungement Law
JOSEPH C. DUGAN*
“Betrayed / I feel so enslaved / I really tried / I did my time / I did my time . . . .”1

INTRODUCTION
In Parker v. Ellis, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that “[c]onviction of a felony
imposes a status upon a person which not only makes him vulnerable to future
sanctions . . . but which also seriously affects his reputation and economic
opportunities.” 2 While criminal conviction inflicts a necessary disability on the
offender, expungement law presents a fitting remedy for the ex-offender:
expungement ensures that employers, licensing agencies, and communities view an
individual in light of her character today rather than the mistakes she made in her
distant past.3
Until recently, Indiana’s criminal records scheme was unforgiving. Hoosiers
convicted of even minor offenses had few opportunities to wipe the proverbial slate
clean. 4 But in 2011, the General Assembly commenced a legislative project that
culminated in a comprehensive expungement statute, enacted in July 2013 5 and
substantially amended in March 2014. 6 Under this new criminal records regime,

* J.D. candidate, 2015, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. My gratitude to
Matthew Hutchens and Nick Roberts for their helpful feedback on this project; thanks also to
Jamie Davis and Joe Stephens for their careful edits. I dedicate this Note to Jamie Andree and
her team at the Bloomington office of Indiana Legal Services, Inc., for exemplifying
wholehearted client service—and to Heidi, for sharing this frenetic but richly rewarding law
school journey with me.
1. KORN, Did My Time, on TAKE A LOOK IN THE MIRROR (Epic/Immortal 2003).
2. 362 U.S. 574, 593–94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted), overruled
in part by Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
3. “It is a legal principle that correctional law is forgiving. Forgiveness is part and parcel
of rehabilitation, whether of criminals or anyone else who has erred, or who has, in fact, what
all of us have—the defects of being human.” SOL RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 788
(2d ed. 1973), quoted in Luz A. Carrion, Comment, Rethinking Expungement of Juvenile
Records in Massachusetts: The Case of Commonwealth v. Gavin G., 38 NEW ENG. L. REV.
331, 331 (2004).
4. Indiana’s former expungement scheme can be sharply contrasted with more generous
schemes in other jurisdictions. Compare IND. CODE § 35-38-5-5 (2008) (providing that
ex-convicts may petition the state police to limit access to their criminal histories if more than
fifteen years have elapsed since they were last discharged from prison, probation, or parole),
with D.C. CODE § 16-803(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (stipulating that courts will seal records
of an “eligible” offense if eight years have elapsed since the completion of the sentence and
the petitioner satisfies other criteria), and OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225 (2011) (specifying that
courts must generally grant expungement for a lower-grade offense if the petitioner has
completed her sentence and at least three years have passed since the date of her conviction).
5. Act of May 6, 2013, No. 159, 2013 Ind. Acts 1631 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of IND. CODE tit. 35 (Supp. 2013)).
6. Act of Mar. 26, 2014, No. 181, 2014 Ind. Acts 2291 (codified as amended in scattered
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ex-offenders may qualify for expungement of most misdemeanors and some felonies.
Upon signing the statute into law, Governor Mike Pence declared, “Indiana should
be the worst place in America to commit a serious crime and the best place, once
you’ve done your time, to get a second chance.”7
Indiana’s new expungement law represents a laudable step toward augmenting
the rights of reformed Hoosiers, and the 2014 amendments correct several
deficiencies that inhered in the original statute. Nevertheless, the law remains a
work in progress. Its procedures are convoluted. Its remedies are flimsy. It excludes
certain classes of petitioners while setting an unreasonably high bar for others. Its
“one-bite-at-the-apple” limitation and repayment prerequisites are unrealistic,
particularly for low-income petitioners.
This Note evaluates the transformation of Indiana’s expungement law. Part I
addresses the socioeconomic impacts of a criminal record. Part II presents normative
arguments both for and against expungement, concluding that the balance tips in
favor of forgiveness. Parts III–IV discuss Indiana’s original expungement provisions,
the 2013 statute, and the 2014 amendments. Part V explores the reaction to the new
law. Finally, Part VI offers recommendations to improve the statute so that its
second-chance promise is equitable, accessible, and robust.
I. STIGMATIZATION AND THE RIGHTS OF THE REFORMED
Sociologists have long decried the stigma associated with a criminal record.8 In a
seminal 1963 exposition on stigma, Professor Erving Goffman described the Greek
origins of the term: stigma referred to “signs designed to expose something unusual
and bad about the moral status of the signifier . . . a blemished person, ritually
polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places.”9 Goffman traced the elements
of stigma through the interactions of three distinct groups: the own (persons who

sections of IND. CODE tit. 35 (Supp. 2014)).
7. Lesley Weidenbener, Pence Signs Off on Rewrite of Expungement Procedure,
EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, May 7, 2013, at 5A.
8. Victor Hugo eloquently captured this “rap-sheet stigma” in Les Misérables, where
ex-convict Jean Valjean recounted the parade of horribles that met him upon his reentry into
society:
I was liberated four days ago, and started for Pontarlier . . . . I went to the inn,
but was sent away in consequence of my yellow passport, which I had shown at
the police office. . . . [N]o one would have any dealings with me. I went to the
prison, but the jailer would not take me in. I got into a dog’s kennel, but the dog
bit me and drove me off, as if it had been a man.
VICTOR HUGO, LES MISÉRABLES 72 (Lascelles Wraxall trans., Heritage Press 1938) (1862).
The Indiana Supreme Court has also written about the deleterious effects of rap-sheet stigma:
[W]hen an adult is convicted of a crime, the conviction is a stigma that follows
him through life, creating many roadblocks to rehabilitation. In addition to the
general stigma of being an “ex-con”, or a felon, the conviction subjects him to
being found a habitual criminal if he later commits additional felonies, and
affects his credibility as a witness in future trials.
Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 409 (Ind. 1987).
9. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 1 (Simon
& Schuster Inc. 1986) (1963).
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share the disfavored trait), the wise (persons sympathetic to the stigmatized group),
and the normals (persons who reinforce the stigma).10 The wise might be of some
comfort to the own, but these sympathizers themselves hover on the margins of
society: far more common are the normals, who perceive that stigmatized persons
are “not quite human” and who “exercise varieties of discrimination” to “effectively,
if often unthinkingly, reduce [their] life chances.”11
Goffman’s theory applies with particular force to convicted criminals and
ex-offenders. In a 2004 article, Professors Meares, Katyal, and Kahan wrote that
interactions with the law-abiding world are problematic for persons convicted of
crimes: the risk is high that normals will “define a criminal only in terms of his stigma”
and avoid associating with him for fear of being contaminated.12 This disassociation,
characterized in this Note as “rap-sheet stigma,” prompts the ex-offender to offend
once more: he may perceive that “other options are closed” to him.13
A. Sentenced in Perpetuity? Economic Considerations
Devah Pager, a sociologist from Northwestern University, explored the
economics of rap-sheet stigma in a 2003 study.14 Pager found that “ex-offenders are
only one-half to one-third as likely as nonoffenders to be considered by employers.”15
In a separate study cited by The Economist, sixty-five percent of employers in major
cities admitted that they would not knowingly hire an ex-convict.16 These numbers
comport with an earlier survey of employers in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los
Angeles, which found that only thirty-eight percent would likely accept an
application from an ex-convict.17

10. Rachel A. Smith, Segmenting an Audience into the Own, the Wise, and Normals: A
Latent Class Analysis of Stigma-Related Categories, 29 COMM. RES. REP. 257, 258 (2012).
11. GOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 28; see also Amy Myrick, Facing Your Criminal Record:
Expungement and the Collateral Problem of Wrongfully Represented Self, 47 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 73, 77–78 (2013) (linking Goffman’s theory of stigma and “spoiled identity” to the
criminal records context).
12. Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1184 (2004).
13. Id. As another author put it, the ex-offender may find that “the only way to live in society
is as a deviant. He re-offends, and fulfills the very expectations placed upon him” by his
community. Jennifer Leavitt, Comment, Walking a Tightrope: Balancing Competing Public
Interests in the Employment of Criminal Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1282–83 (2002).
14. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937 (2003).
15. Id. at 960.
16. Prison and Beyond: A Stigma That Never Fades, ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2002, at 25, 26.
17. Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Will Employers Hire Former
Offenders?: Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their Determinants, in
IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 205, 209–10 (Mary
Pattillo, David Weiman & Bruce Western eds., 2004). The surveyed employers were far more
willing to consider members of other stigmatized groups, including welfare recipients (92%)
and high school dropouts with GEDs (96%). Id. at 210. Employer unease with criminal records
may explain why in New York State, up to sixty percent of formerly incarcerated persons are
still unemployed one year after their release. Aaron Smith, Out of Prison, Out of a Job, Out of
Luck, CNNMONEY (Nov. 11, 2009, 6:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/11/news
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The statistics are telling, but it is the stories of struggling individuals that are
particularly distressing. Pager described a letter she received from an unemployed
father: while the man was earnestly seeking employment, a decade-old conviction
was proving an impenetrable barrier.18 The man’s “heart broke each morning when
his six-year-old daughter would leave for school and say to him, ‘Good luck in your
job search, Daddy!’ knowing that he would have to face her later that day with
nothing more to offer.”19 An Indiana resident observed that his criminal record is the
only thing that employers seem to care about.20 “It’s very difficult for a felon. . . .
You realize that you’ve made a mistake; you’ve served your time for it; you’ve paid
the consequence. So it’s time to get back on track with your life.”21 Getting back on
track is a daunting feat indeed when employers treat a rap sheet as a scarlet letter.22
B. Juvenile Crime and Brutal Need
Expungement remedies the deleterious effects of rap-sheet stigma. This remedy
is meaningful for anyone with a criminal past, but it is especially critical for two
vulnerable classes: former juvenile delinquents and brutally impoverished
ex-offenders.
1. The Young
In a 1963 study on society’s “sense of justice,” psychiatrists Edmund Bergler and
Joost Meerloo described juvenile delinquency as a “catch-all term applied to all types

/economy/convict_employment/.
18. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 154 (2007).
19. Id.
20. Vic Ryckaert, New Law Gives Former Offenders a Second Chance, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Aug. 29, 2013, at B1.
21. Id.
22. One might argue that the perpetual punishment of a public record, evidenced by the
job-related struggles of the reformed, straddles the line of unconstitutionality. See IND. CONST.
art. I, § 16 (“Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be
proportioned to the nature of the offense.”); Pritscher v. State, 675 N.E.2d 727, 731 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996) (“A sentence, even under a valid statute, may be unconstitutional by reason of its
length, if it is so severe and entirely out of proportion to the gravity of the offenses committed
as ‘to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of a reasonable people.’” (quoting Cox
v. State, 181 N.E. 469, 472 (Ind. 1932))); see also Erin Westbrook, Comment, Collateral
Sanctions as Punitive Sentences and the Minnesota Judiciary’s Expungement Authority, 9 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 959, 959–60 (2012) (“When an individual commits a crime, a judge imposes a
criminal sentence based upon the sentencing guidelines, which allow for consideration of a
variety of factors, including criminal history and the nature of the offense. The sentencing
guidelines provide safeguards to ensure that a sentence is justified and follows traditionally
recognized theories and goals of punishment. Yet, once an offender has fulfilled her sentence,
she faces reentry into society under the shadow of a criminal record that, among other restrictions,
prevents her from securing adequate employment and housing. And whereas the offender’s
judicially imposed sentence is subject to judicial discretion within the limits of sentencing
guidelines, the collateral ‘sentence’ is not subject to the same safeguards.”).
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of legally proscribed actions when the offender happens to be in his or her teens.”23
Bergler and Meerloo observed that delinquent boys and girls are “filled with a feeling
of savage indignation; life, they are convinced, has cheated them out of something.”24
This indignation may be a product of the physiological effects of puberty, the sordid
conditions of life in lower-class communities, or the failure of parents to meet their
children’s psychological needs. 25 Whatever the cause, “something in [these
children]—their unconscious—has stacked the cards to ensure their own disaster.”26
Much more recently, psychiatrist Andrew Solomon portrayed the untenable plight
of juvenile delinquents in Far from the Tree.27 While acknowledging that “some
people seem to be born without a moral center,” Solomon argued that for most
juveniles, “the criminal potential requires external stimulus to be activated; the
intense, internally determined psychopath of the movies is unusual.”28 Yet, Solomon
continued, most of criminal law is “organized around the notion that young criminals
are intractably malign.” 29 Courts are complicit in this convention: they waive
juvenile offenders into adult court with ever-increasing frequency, particularly those
juveniles who present themselves poorly or appear to lack supportive families.30
Especially troubling is the criminal law’s failure to acknowledge the
psychological and physiological limitations that encumber children:
Biological evidence now demonstrates that the adolescent brain is
structurally different from the adult one . . . . In the prefrontal cortex of
a fifteen-year-old, the areas responsible for self-control are undeveloped;
many parts of the brain do not mature until about twenty-four. . . .
[H]olding children to adult standards is biologically naïve.31
No one would seriously argue, and this Note does not contend, that juveniles
should be granted some kind of carte blanche: even young people can cause serious
harm, and the criminal justice system can function to rehabilitate miscreants of all

23. EDMUND BERGLER & JOOST A. M. MEERLOO, JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE 44 (1963).
24. Id. at 45.
25. Id. at 46–49; see also Press Release, Univ. of Pittsburgh, Yelling Doesn’t Help, May
Harm Adolescents, Pitt-Led Study Finds (Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://www.news.pitt.edu
/news/yelling-doesn-t-help-may-harm-adolescents-pitt-led-study-finds (citing new research that
indicates harsh verbal discipline, like physical punishment, may drive adolescents toward
depressive symptoms and antisocial behaviors).
26. BERGLER & MEERLOO, supra note 23, at 64.
27. ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE SEARCH FOR
IDENTITY (2012).
28. Id. at 544.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 546. Solomon described additional factors that weigh against too harsh a
response to juvenile crime. Three out of four incarcerated children have a mental health
diagnosis; between fifty and eighty percent have learning disabilities. Id. at 549. And while
Solomon acknowledged that the “post-Freudian notion that all flaws are based in family
relations is out of favor,” he recounted several observations of children whose parents “seemed
unacquainted with the usual rules of love.” Id. at 554.
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ages.32 But children who fall into crime long before they have the cognitive maturity
or life experience to understand the consequences of their actions—and who, as
Bergler, Meerloo, and Solomon have suggested, offend within a framework of
circumstances beyond their control—are especially deserving of expungement. 33 If
these kids “do their time,” and if they change their ways, the same society that is quick
to lock them up should be equally swift to extend forgiveness and a second chance.34
2. The Poor
Expungement provides appropriate relief not only to former juvenile offenders
but also to the severely impoverished, those persons with “brutal need”35 who resort
to crime as a reaction or perhaps a temporal solution to their poverty.
Detroit presents a useful case study. The Motor City (“Motown”), ranked by
Forbes as the most dangerous city in America for five years running,36 is also the
nation’s poorest large city.37 About forty-one percent of Detroiters, and a shocking
sixty percent of children, live below the federal poverty line. 38 With the city in
bankruptcy and with many government programs in jeopardy due to statewide budget

32. Cf. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909) (“Why is
it not the duty of the state, instead of asking merely whether a boy or a girl has committed a
specific offense, to find out what he is . . . and then if it learns that he is treading the path that
leads to criminality, to take him in charge, not so much to punish as to reform, not to degrade
but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen.”).
33. See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (reciting differences between
juvenile and adult offenders and recognizing that juveniles have an understandable lack of
maturity, a tendency to fall prey to negative influences, and transitory personality traits).
34. See RUBIN, supra note 3, at 788 (“Forgiveness is part and parcel of rehabilitation.”).
Additional arguments cut in favor of generous expungement schemes for children adjudicated
as delinquents. Justice Rehnquist wrote in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. that juvenile
criminal records bring “undue embarrassment to the families of youthful offenders and may
cause the juvenile to lose employment opportunities.” 443 U.S. 97, 108 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment). From a different angle, public records may “provide the hardcore
delinquent the kind of attention he seeks, thereby encouraging him to commit further antisocial
acts.” Id. Ultimately, criminal records may “defeat the beneficent and rehabilitative purposes”
of juvenile justice: publicity may place “additional stress on [the juvenile] during a difficult
period of adjustment in the community, and [may] interfere[] with his adjustment at various
points when he was otherwise proceeding adequately.” Id. at 108 & n.1 (quoting David C.
Howard, J. Thomas Grisso & Robert Neems, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 203, 210 (1977)).
35. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
36. Daniel Fisher, Detroit Again Tops List of Most Dangerous Cities, as Crime Rate Dips,
FORBES (Oct. 22, 2013, 7:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/10/22
/detroit-again-tops-list-of-most-dangerous-cities-but-crime-rate-dips/.
37. Kevin D. Williamson, Detroit Goes Down: A Lesson for American Cities, NAT’L REV.
(July 19, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/353862/detroit-goes-down
-kevin-d-williamson.
38. See Detroit, MI, CENSUS REPORTER, http://censusreporter.org/profiles
/16000US2622000-detroit-mi/; Irwin Redlener, Amid Bankruptcy, Detroit Has a Bigger
Problem, USA TODAY (July 29, 2013, 6:16 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion
/2013/07/29/detroit-bankruptcy-child-poverty-column/2597227/.
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cuts and federal sequestration, aid resources are sparse: one social service agency
reported that its 2013 budget for emergency shelters was reduced by over forty
percent. 39 Scott Paul, President of the Alliance for American Manufacturing,
observed that “[i]n Detroit, it’s come down to matters of basic survival: keeping the
water turned on, providing basic public services, determining which blocks to raze
and which to save.”40
The link between poverty and crime, in Detroit and in penurious communities
across America, is not difficult to fathom. Hunger gives rise to theft; the fires of arson
rage as property owners seek to cash out insurance policies.41 Controlled substances
present a tempting reprieve from bleak circumstances.42 Violence, too, escalates with
poverty. Analysts Ching-Chi Hsieh and M.D. Pugh concluded in a 1993 study that
“resource deprivation is an underlying cause of violent crime and that poverty and
income inequality are both indicators of resource deprivation.”43 Economist Richard
McAdams echoed these concerns, writing that “[a]n economic cost of inequality is
greater street crime.”44
Understanding the link between poverty and crime helps one understand the
relationship between the two classes this Note has identified as particularly deserving
of expungement: juvenile offenders and the brutally poor. Children born into poverty
are susceptible to delinquency. As Professor Richard Delgado observed, “It is
absurdly callous to assert that poverty, lack of opportunity, a poor education, and
desperate circumstances play no role in predisposing people to lives of crime,
especially if they are born into those circumstances and live in them all their lives.”45

39. Bill Laitner, As Poverty Spreads and Funding Is Cut, Charities Need Metro
Detroiters’ Help, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.freep.com/article
/20131124/NEWS05/311240071/homeless-SNAP-Salvation-Army-Detroit.
40. Scott Paul, Is What I Saw in Detroit America’s Future?, HUFFINGTON POST (July 25,
2014, 3:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-paul/is-what-i-saw-in-detroit_b
_5621756.html?utm_hp_ref=detroit&ir=Detroit. Television personality and erstwhile chef
Anthony Bourdain put the matter more colorfully: “The only place I’ve ever been that looks
anything like Detroit does now is Chernobyl.” Anthony Bourdain Parts Unknown: Detroit
(CNN cable transmission Nov. 10, 2013).
41. See, e.g., State v. Enright, 2000 MT 372, 303 Mont. 457, 16 P.3d 366; State v.
Murdock, 500 P.2d 387 (Mont. 1972); Phillips v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 640 N.Y.S.2d
24 (App. Div. 1996). In some jurisdictions, merely soliciting funds may constitute a crime.
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-45-17-1 (2008) (criminalizing begging in circumstances such as after
sunset or before sunrise, at a bus stop, near a restaurant, or with a partner); cf. Speet v. Schuette,
726 F.3d 867 (6th Cir. 2013) (ruling that Michigan’s broad antibegging statute facially violated
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
42. See Sandra Langley, The Homeless in Utah—Reflections from a New Bar Member,
UTAH B.J., Dec. 1997, at 36, 37 (“Many believe that the degrading nature of poverty itself is
to blame for so many turning to some form of chemical relief. Approximately 17% of the
homeless are physically disabled. The average life expectancy for homeless people is 51. Given
the foregoing, is it any wonder that findings show anywhere from 48% to 80% of the homeless
are seriously depressed, three to five times the national average.” (footnotes omitted)).
43. Ching-Chi Hsieh & M.D. Pugh, Poverty, Income Inequality, and Violent Crime: A
Meta-Analysis of Recent Aggregate Data Studies, 18 CRIM. JUST. REV. 182, 198 (1993).
44. Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 37.
45. Richard Delgado, The Wretched of the Earth, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 1, 19 (2011).
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Some jurists and criminologists have gone so far as to suggest that courts should
recognize a kind of “poverty defense,” at least for certain economically motivated
crimes.46 Such a defense, however academically intriguing, seems unlikely to gain
much traction given the tough-on-crime realpolitik of contemporary society.47 Yet
liberal expungement laws could provide a more modest and palatable mechanism for
addressing the relationship between poverty and crime. Criminal records prevent
members of impoverished communities from obtaining employment, but these
records have other collateral consequences as well: they may lead to denial of
housing, ineligibility for cash assistance, and disqualification for retirement
benefits.48 Unemployed and unlikely to secure gainful work with the stigma of a rap
sheet, ex-offenders are left with few alternatives—and “America’s poorest
communities, especially those of color, bear the brunt of the pervasive cycle of arrest,
incarceration, and reentry.” 49 Expungement throws a wrench in the gears of that
cycle, ensuring that an ex-offender, having satisfied the penalty imputed by law, can
once again enjoy the rights and privileges afforded to all persons in a society of

46. E.g., United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that there may be a “significant causal relationship between violent
criminal behavior and a ‘rotten social background’”); Delgado, supra note 45, at 14 (arguing
that society’s failure to recognize a defense of “severe environmental deprivation” makes
some impoverished defendants double victims).
47. But see State v. Marrs, 723 N.W.2d 499, 505 (Neb. 2006) (“When imposing a
sentence, a sentencing judge should consider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3)
education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or
record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of
the offense, and (8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.”).
48. Beth Johnson, Helping Clients with Criminal Records: It’s More Than Expungement,
CBA REC., Oct. 2013, at 32, 33. In a 2003 report, the ABA acknowledged the insipid nature
of these collateral consequences: “they often take effect without judicial consideration of their
appropriateness in the particular case” and without any requirement that the parties even be
aware of them. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS R-1 (3d ed. 2003), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2003/journal/101a.authch
eckdam.pdf; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 92 (2010) (“Once a person is labeled a felon, he or she is ushered
into a parallel universe in which discrimination, stigma, and exclusion are perfectly legal, and
privileges of citizenship such as voting and jury service are off-limits.”); National Inventory
of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, ABA COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES,
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org (identifying 1978 collateral consequences under
federal and state law in Indiana).
49. Leavitt, supra note 13, at 1281; see also Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the
Past: An Overview of Criminal Expungement Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1379 (2005) (“Without access to housing and employment,
[ex-offenders] face a Hobson’s choice: they can be law-abiding, but homeless and penniless,
or they can recidivate and have income.”). In a situation bordering on the absurd, a homeless
ex-convict was reincarcerated in 2012 after he tossed a brick through the glass doors of a
federal courthouse, concluding that a warm prison bed was preferable to another night on the
streets. WTVM, Homeless Man Intentionally Commits Crime To Go Back to Prison,
WSFA.COM (Apr. 25, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://www.wsfa.com/story/17695143/homeless
-man-intentionally-commits-crime-to-go-back-to-prison.
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equals. As Professor Fruqan Mouzon observed, “Human fallibility makes
forgiveness a cornerstone of civilized society.”50
II. A NORMATIVE DEBATE
The socioeconomic effects of rap-sheet stigma supply compelling justification for
a robust expungement scheme. However, other arguments cut in different directions.
Before evaluating Indiana’s law, it is helpful to review these underlying ethical
considerations. This Part will begin by presenting several arguments in favor of
indelible records and public access; it will then consider additional arguments in
support of erasure and confidentiality.
A. Expungement as Unmerited Reward
Perhaps the strongest argument against what critics term “aggressive”
expungement 51 is the need for communities to be informed about the hazards
presented by their neighbors. In United States v. Flowers, the Seventh Circuit
explained that “expungement is, in fact, an extraordinary remedy and . . . ‘unwarranted
adverse consequences’ must be uniquely significant in order to outweigh the strong
public interest in maintaining accurate and undoctored records.”52
Obviously, access to such records may affect the choices that individuals make:
where to move, whether to leave the kids unattended, which contractor to hire for a
construction job. 53 But access transcends individual decision making: Professor
James Diehm pointed out that in most jurisdictions, the licensing process for
members of the legal, medical, pharmaceutical, and accounting professions includes
a criminal background check to ensure that “the applicant is a person of integrity and
deserving of the public trust.”54 Professor Diehm warned that “[s]erious problems

50. Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement
Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008); cf. 111 CONG. REC. 1427 (1965) (legislative
prayer of Reverend Bernard Braskamp) (“O Thou God of all grace and goodness . . . . We
penitently confess that our hearts are often cold and callous and we fail to have a keen sense
of our social responsibility and a sincere interest in the welfare of needy humanity. Grant that
in the great adventure of building a better world we may know how to coordinate practical
commonsense with lofty idealism.”).
51. See, e.g., T. Markus Funk & Daniel D. Polsby, Distributional Consequences of
Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records: The Problem of Lemons, 52 WASH. U.J. URB.
& CONTEMP. L. 161 (1997).
52. 389 F.3d 737, 739 (2004).
53. But see Michael D. Mayfield, Comment, Revisiting Expungement: Concealing
Information in the Information Age, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 1057, 1065 (“[E]xpungement only
increases the risk of danger to the public indirectly. The average citizen does not have access
to criminal records. As a result, there is no increased risk to the average citizen when records
are expunged. A typical citizen would not likely take additional precautions when dealing with
an offender whose record is expunged because the citizen is usually not aware the criminal
record ever existed.”).
54. James W. Diehm, Federal Expungement: A Concept in Need of a Definition, 66 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 73, 76 (1992).
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may arise if the applicant’s criminal record has been expunged.”55 Professor Diehm
also expressed concern that expungement may impede law enforcement officers in
their review of forensic evidence and serial offenses,56 although this concern may be
mitigated in jurisdictions in which police investigators retain access to expunged
records for official purposes.57
Another, less obvious, concern with state expungement schemes is their tendency
to conflict with federal laws and regulations. Writing in 2013 shortly after the
passage of Indiana’s comprehensive expungement statute, attorneys for Bose
McKinney & Evans LLP noted that its remedies provision conflicts with section 19
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which prohibits FDIC-insured institutions from
employing persons convicted of certain trust-related offenses without first securing
an FDIC waiver. 58 Thus, a bank in Indiana is placed in the delicate position of
complying with both state law—which prohibits it from discriminating on the basis
of expunged records—and federal law—which compels it to inquire about the
contents of such records and to take appropriate action.59 Expungement statutes may
conflict with other federal laws as well, such as criminal laws with elements
relating to prior convictions60 and laws governing the distribution of welfare benefits to
former drug offenders.61

55. Id.
56. Id. at 77.
57. E.g., IND. CODE § 35-38-9-6(a)(1)–(2) (Supp. 2014) (authorizing release of expunged
records to law enforcement officers, defense and prosecuting attorneys, and DHS/FBI officials
acting in the course of duty).
58. HEA 1482 Makes It Unlawful To Discriminate Based on Expunged Criminal Records,
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS LLP (June 6, 2013), http://www.boselaw.com/2013/06/hea-1482
-makes-unlawful-discriminate-based-expunged-criminal-records/. The Bose attorneys noted
that under FDIC policy, records that have been completely expunged—such that no one,
including law enforcement, can access them—will not disqualify a candidate. Id. But most
contemporary state expungement statutes, including Indiana’s, allow for some official access.
59. Conflict preemption doctrine provides a solution here: where federal law directly
conflicts with state law, federal law must trump: “There can be no dispute that the Supremacy
Clause invalidates all state laws that conflict or interfere with an Act of Congress.” Rose
v. Ark. State Police, 479 U.S. 1, 3 (1986); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). Still, hiring
managers and HR professionals at FDIC-insured institutions may lack expertise on the finer
points of constitutional law, and state-federal conflicts burden these professionals.
60. See United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 1975) (Sneed, J., concurring in
the result) (“[S]tate law must be examined to determine whether the defendant has been
convicted of a felony. The relevant state law to be examined in this determination does not
include expunction statutes. Such statutes do not rewrite history; they merely provide that
previous history is immaterial for certain purposes under state law. It is not within the power
of a state to make such history immaterial to the administration of the federal criminal law or
the interpretation of federal criminal statutes. Only Congress can do that.” (emphasis added)).
61. Compare § 35-38-9-10(e) (Supp. 2014) (“A person whose record is expunged shall
be treated as if the person had never been convicted of the offense.”), with DIV. OF FAMILY
RES., IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
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Finally, some critics oppose expungement on moral or penological grounds. In a
1970 article, practitioners Bernard Kogon and Donald Loughery, Jr., blasted what
they saw as a casual and uncritical acceptance of expungement law, writing:
In trying to conceal a record we seek to falsify history—to legislate an
untruth. Such suppression of truth ill befits a democratic society. Good
intentions are no defense. To enable an offender to deny that he has a
criminal record when in fact he has one is to help him deny a part of his
identity.62
Almost three decades later, T. Markus Funk and Daniel Polsby argued that
“labeling theorists,” who believe that the “perceptions of others control or influence
one’s behavior,” overlook the “value of the symbolic significance that attaches to
any form of punishment” and the “importance of making the person labeled aware
that he has violated communal values, and that such violations carry with them
certain negative consequences.”63 Commentators like Kogon and Loughery, Funk
and Polsby seem to view a criminal record as a suitable penalty for a person who has
broken the social compact: it may be his cross to bear, but it is a cross of his own
construction. One is reminded of Jacob Marley, usurer of Dickensian lore,64 fettered
with the chains he forged, link by link, through his avarice.65

(SNAP) FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2012) (“There is a federal law that states anyone
with a drug conviction after 8/22/1996 is ineligible to receive SNAP benefits indefinitely. It is
possible for state legislatures to override this federal law. To date, Indiana has not.”); see also
S. 286, 118th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2014) (bill that would have extended SNAP
and TANF benefits to former drug offenders who secured expungement; dead in committee).
62. Bernard Kogon & Donald L. Loughery, Jr., Sealing and Expungement of Criminal
Records—The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 378, 385 (1970); see also
Marc A. Franklin & Diane Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records: Concealment and
Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 749 (1981) (“The expungement model
attempts to rewrite history: it denies reality. This deliberate deception of the public violates
our longstanding and generally unquestioned preference for truth over falsity.”).
63. Funk & Polsby, supra note 51, at 169–71; see also T. Markus Funk, The Dangers of
Hiding Criminal Pasts, 66 TENN. L. REV. 287, 289 (1998) (“[A]ggressive expungement
operates to perversely penalize persons who have conformed their behavior to the dictates of
the law, while providing unjustified gains to those who have not.”). Goffman’s theory offers
one possible response to Professors Funk and Polsby: as long as the normals retain access to
the ex-offender’s record, they will disassociate with him; he may fully appreciate the gravity
of his past misconduct, fully rehabilitate, and yet still find himself ostracized as a common
criminal. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
64. “‘I wear the chain I forged in life,’ replied the Ghost. ‘I made it link by link and yard
by yard; I girded it on of my own free will, and of my own free will I wore it.’” CHARLES
DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 18 (Bradbury & Evans 1858) (1843).
65. The moral/penological argument may carry more normative weight for those offenses
fairly characterized as mala in se: few commentators would seriously argue that society should
quickly forgive and forget such heinous acts as murder and rape. In fact, those more serious
crimes are generally excluded from state expungement schemes, while other crimes—such as
burglary and assault—are subject to stiff requirements and lengthy waiting periods. For mala
prohibita offenses, the moral argument seems less compelling: it is difficult to envision Jacob
Marley forging his links by failing to file a state tax return, drinking by the roadside, or
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B. Expungement as Remedy
Opponents of expungement—or those who favor stringent requirements and
lengthy waiting periods—raise some persuasive arguments. The issue is
complicated, and as a society we should be cautious and deliberate whenever we
attempt to rewrite history. 66 On balance, however, this Note concludes that the
benefits of expungement outweigh its putative costs. This Note has already addressed
the principal argument in favor of a robust expungement scheme—that erasing the
records of reformed ex-offenders can eliminate stigma and the austere economic
consequences that accompany it.67 This Note has also argued that former juvenile
delinquents and brutally poor ex-offenders are particularly deserving of a second
chance.68 There are additional reasons, however, to view expungement not merely as
a humanitarian gesture but as an essential complement to our contemporary criminal
justice system.
First, expungement is a necessary corollary to a system characterized by
exuberant prosecution of mala prohibita and noncore offenses. In a 2004 symposium
article, Professor Douglas Husak of Rutgers proposed that core crimes conform to
one of three patterns of liability: manifest criminality, or inherently dangerous acts;
subjective criminality, or acts intended to violate a protected interest; and harmful
consequences. 69 Conversely, noncore crimes “are best understood to be those
offenses that have not been justified as legitimate exercises of state power over free
and autonomous individuals.”70 Husak expressed concern about the prosecution of
overlapping crimes. 71 He likewise expressed concern about the proliferation of
risk-prevention offenses, such as illicit drug possession.72 Husak’s primary criticism,
however, pertained to the growth of ancillary offenses—crimes to which prosecutors
turn when they lack sufficient evidence to obtain conviction for the conduct they
actually seek to penalize.73
Commentators have approached the problem of excessive criminalization from
various angles, 74 but many concur that “[o]vercriminalization is a matter of

surreptitiously smoking a joint.
66. “In 41 states, people accused or convicted of crimes have the legal right to rewrite
history.” Adam Liptak, Expunged Criminal Records Live to Tell Tales, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/us/17expunge.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
67. See supra Part I.A.
68. See supra Part I.B.
69. Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 TULSA L. REV. 755, 757 (2004) (citing
GREGORY P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978)).
70. Id. at 779.
71. These are crimes that share common elements with other crimes but also contain
distinct elements such that double jeopardy doctrine is not implicated. As a result, prosecutors
can stack charges and courts can assign harsher penalties. Id. at 770–71.
72. Id. at 771.
73. Id. at 771–72 (discussing derivative crimes such as money laundering and
information-gathering offenses such as violations of the Bank Secrecy Act).
74. See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Facilitating Crimes: An Inquiry into the Selective Invocation
of Offenses Within the Continuum of Criminal Procedures, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 665
(2011) (questioning the legitimacy of three categories of crimes that implicate only portions
of the arrest-arraignment-conviction-punishment continuum: detention crimes, which exist
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bi-partisan concern, a proper subject for legislative reform of criminal codes, and
may, in part, explain the increasing numbers in our prisons.”75 Given the American
embrace of comprehensive criminalization and our consequent status as home to the
world’s largest prison population, 76 expungement—particularly for low-level or
mala prohibita offenders—seems not only permissible but necessary. If rap-sheet
stigma is real, and the statistics certainly suggest that it is,77 then we owe it to a
substantial number of our fellow Americans to give them a second lease on life after
they have “done their time” for acts which, perhaps, should not have been
criminalized in the first place.78
Second, expungement complements contemporary initiatives to combat
recidivism. Cognizant of prison crowding and the cycle of incarceration and release,
the federal government led the charge in these initiatives with the passage of the
Second Chance Act of 2007.79 The Act created a buffer between prison and reentry,
doubling inmates’ allowable community confinement from the last six months to the
last twelve months of a sentence.80 It also required the Federal Bureau of Prisons to

principally to facilitate arrests and for which conviction is an afterthought; charging crimes,
which prosecutors employ as instruments to negotiate plea agreements; and pleading crimes,
which rarely provide the basis for an initial arrest but to which defendants plead guilty after
successful bargaining).
75. State v. Copenhaver, 834 N.W.2d 870, at *7 (2013) (unpublished table decision)
(Danilson, J., specially concurring); cf. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54
AM. U. L. REV. 703, 706 (2005) (“Countless petty offenses, civil infractions, and traffic
ordinances are handled by law enforcement in the same fashion as serious offenses or are
bootstrapped into quasi-crimes through legal fictions. Juveniles are not only liable for
violations of the relevant penal code, but also for a variety of ‘status offenses’ involving
behaviors that are perfectly legal for adults—staying out late, smoking or chewing tobacco,
drinking alcohol, having sexual relations, failing to attend class, and so on.”); Michael L.
Travers, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1301 (1995) (“The
criminalization of ostensibly innocent behavior has created situations in which people may be
convicted of serious crimes without having had any idea they were doing something illegal.”).
76. Int’l Ctr. for Prison Studies, Highest to Lowest—Prison Population Total,
PRISONSTUDIES.ORG, http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total
?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All; cf. 15 Years in Environment of Constant Fear Somehow
Fails To Rehabilitate Prisoner, ONION (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.theonion.com/articles/15
-years-in-environment-of-constant-fear-somehow-f,35434/ (satirizing America’s culture of
incarceration) (“Reportedly left dumbfounded by the news that [a] recent parolee . . . had been
reincarcerated on charges of assault and battery, officials . . . struggled Tuesday to make sense
of how the prisoner had not been rehabilitated by 15 years of constant threats, physical abuse,
and periodic isolation.”).
77. See supra Part I.A.
78. See, e.g., Kathleen Miles, Just How Much the War on Drugs Impacts Our Overcrowded
Prisons, in One Chart, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2014, 7:30 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/10/war-on-drugs-prisons-infographic_n_4914884.html
(finding that 50.1% of federal inmates were convicted of drug offenses and 10.6% of
immigration offenses, while only 2.8% were convicted of homicide/assault/kidnapping and a
statistically irrelevant percentage were convicted of national security offenses).
79. Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
80. John Spyros Albanes, Demystifying Risk Assessment: Giving Prisoners a Second
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establish benchmarks for recidivism reduction, and—most notably—it provided
grants for state rehabilitative programs.81 As Representative Danny K. Davis noted
in a March 2013 letter to the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science,
and Related Agencies, state-level investment in reentry programs has resulted in
double-digit recidivism declines in recent years.82 Reentry programs often involve
significant government expenditures—funding for housing, workforce development,
and substance abuse treatment programs. 83 But the ultimate success or failure of
these programs will turn on how effectively they equip ex-offenders to achieve
normalcy in their communities. Federal funding alone will not offset rap-sheet
stigma, but expungement can. When viewed as part of the national effort to combat
recidivism, a robust expungement scheme makes sense.84
Finally, expungement serves as a kind of meager reparation for low-income
defendants marginalized by an overworked and underregulated criminal justice
system. This point bears emphasizing: expungement is payback for defendants
abused by a broken system in which due process is too often an ideal rather than a
constitutional guarantee. The case of Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon illustrates the
problem.85 In Wilbur, a class of indigent criminal defendants brought an action to
challenge the adequacy of the public defense systems in Mount Vernon and
Burlington, Washington. The court found that indigent defendants in these cities were
“systematically deprived of the assistance of counsel at critical stages of the
prosecution and that municipal policymakers have made deliberate choices regarding
the funding, contracting, and monitoring of the public defense system that directly and
predictably caused the deprivation.”86 The cities’ public defense contract, according to
which a private firm was paid $17,500 per month for a caseload of approximately 1700
cases (or just over $10 per case) rendered it “virtually impossible that the lawyer, no
matter how competent or diligent, will be able to provide effective assistance.”87
The situation in Mount Vernon and Burlington was not anomalous: Professor
Michelle Alexander noted that while roughly eighty percent of criminal defendants
are indigent, the “quality of court-appointed counsel is poor because the miserable
working conditions and low pay discourage good attorneys from participating in the
system.” 88 Carrie Johnson of National Public Radio recited calls for a bipartisan
White House commission to evaluate impediments to justice and fairness for

Chance at Individualized Community Confinement Under the Second Chance Act, 64 ADMIN.
L. REV. 937, 945 (2012).
81. Id. at 946.
82. Letter from Danny K. Davis, Member of Cong. (Mar. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.csh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/FY14SCAAppropriationsLetter.pdf.
83. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces
More Than $62 Million To Strengthen Reentry, Probation and Parole Programs (Nov. 13,
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/November/13-ag-1217.html.
84. See BRIAN FASK, CHICAGO COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, EXPUNGEMENT: A BEGINNING
TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM (2004).
85. 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
86. Id. at 1124.
87. Id. at 1132.
88. ALEXANDER, supra note 48, at 84.
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low-income defendants. 89 One hopes that increasing awareness of the plight of
indigent defendants may begin to level the playing field,90 but for the time being,
many of our nation’s poorest ex-convicts are hamstrung by records stemming from
deficient process. Expungement cannot erase the trauma of negotiating the system
alone, but it can shield these victims of conveyor-belt justice from stigma that might
otherwise drive them back to prison.91
III. IND. CODE § 35-38-5: INDIANA’S ORIGINAL EXPUNGEMENT STATUTE
Having concluded that the benefits of robust expungement outweigh its costs, this
Note now turns to evaluate the particularities of Indiana’s law. Prior to 2011,
Hoosiers who wished to restrict access to their criminal records had few options.
Indiana’s original “Expungement of Arrest Records” statute, enacted in 1983,
provided that individuals could petition for expungement if they were arrested and
released without charge or if the charges filed against them were dropped due to
mistaken identity, no offense in fact, or absence of probable cause.92 For individuals
who were actually convicted of a crime—even a low-level misdemeanor—there were
no opportunities for expungement per se. If these individuals completed their
sentences and waited fifteen years without incurring additional convictions, they could
petition the Indiana State Police to restrict access to their records.93 Even so, agencies
that had previously obtained the records were under no obligation to seal or destroy
them. Furthermore, while the statute provided that law enforcement officials who
violated its terms could face charges, no such sanctions applied to private actors.94
Case law confirms the harsh and sometimes arbitrary limitations imposed by the
original expungement statute. In Kleiman v. State, the petitioner sought to expunge
his arrest record after he was acquitted of a Class A misdemeanor charge for public
indecency.95 The Court of Appeals of Indiana found that the petitioner did not qualify
for expungement because the state did not drop all charges against him.96 In a similar
vein, the court of appeals in Blake v. State found that an ex-convict who served out

89. Carrie Johnson, Legal Advocates Want Overhaul of Public Defender System, NPR
(Oct. 2, 2013, 6:14 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/10/02/228572418/legal
-advocates-want-overhaul-of-public-defender-system (discussing such impediments as
flat-fee public defender contracts and cash bail systems).
90. Cf. infra notes 234–235 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
92. IND. CODE § 35-38-5-1(a) (2008) (repealed 2014).
93. § 35-38-5-5 (2008). Even this limited remedy had its own limitations: it did not apply to
petitioners who had volunteered to provide childcare in conjunction with a social service or
nonprofit agency, and it did not apply to petitioners who owed child support. See § 10-13-3-27(a)(8),
(12) (2010).
94. See § 35-38-5-6 (2008).
95. 590 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
96. Id. at 663; cf. Smith v. State, No. 41A04-0608-CV-441, 2007 WL 1815706 (Ind. Ct.
App. June 26, 2007) (unpublished) (finding that where state withdrew charges for unknown
reason and petitioner could not fit his argument within the narrow provisions of chapter 5,
petitioner could not qualify for expungement).
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his sentence and subsequently obtained a gubernatorial pardon was not entitled to
expungement of his arrest records: the statute did not reach such circumstances.97
In State ex rel. Indiana State Police v. Arnold, the Indiana Supreme Court carved
out some additional space for would-be petitioners with multiple arrests on record.98
In so doing, the court abrogated State v. Reynolds, an earlier decision by the court of
appeals. In Reynolds, the court had interpreted the expungement statute to
categorically exclude petitioners who had additional charges pending against them.99
The Arnold court rejected this hardline analysis, finding that the statute’s overall
“animating principle” was one of trial court discretion.100
While Arnold seemingly broadened the pool of potential petitioners, just two
years later, the court of appeals in Zagorac v. State reaffirmed key limitations of the
expungement statute.101 After the state filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of a
victim’s inability to testify, the petitioner sought to expunge his arrest record.102 The
trial court declined to grant expungement, and the petitioner appealed, arguing that
the statute violated the privileges and immunities clause of Indiana’s state
constitution. 103 Expungement was available under chapter 5, section 1 if charges
were never filed or if they were dropped under qualifying circumstances.104 Records
could be sealed under section 5 for petitioners who actually served out their sentences

97. 860 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The Blake court did grant the petitioner an
expungement of his conviction records (as opposed to his arrest records), relying not on any
statutory provision but rather on a principle from case law. Id. at 631. The pertinent distinction
was that chapter 5 spoke explicitly to arrest records while saying nothing about conviction
records, and thus the court was free to act in equity.
98. 906 N.E.2d 167 (Ind. 2009).
99. 774 N.E.2d 902, 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The Reynolds court based its analysis on
the following statutory text:
After a hearing is held under this section, the petition shall be granted unless the
court finds: (1) the conditions . . . have not been met; (2) the individual has a
record of arrests other than minor traffic offenses; or (3) additional criminal
charges are pending against the individual.
§ 35-38-5-1(f) (2008) (repealed 2014).
100. Arnold, 906 N.E.2d at 171. In reaching its determination, the Arnold court
hypothesized that an unlucky person could be twice arrested in cases of mistaken identity. The
court concluded that the legislature surely intended discretion in such a situation. Id. Shortly
after Arnold, the court of appeals took up Gerber v. State, a case in which the petitioner sought
expungement after the state elected not to file charges in connection with a domestic dispute.
912 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The trial judge denied the petition, opining that a
reasonable period of time had not passed since the petitioner’s arrest and ruling that petitioners
must wait for the statute of limitations to run before seeking expungement. Id. at 387–88. In
another decision favorable to petitioners, the court of appeals held that in spite of his
considerable discretion, the trial judge was not authorized to rewrite the statute. Id. at 390–91.
101. 943 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
102. Id. at 386.
103. Id. at 392; see also IND. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“The General Assembly shall not grant to
any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall
not equally belong to all citizens.”).
104. See § 35-38-5-1(a) (2008) (repealed 2014).
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and avoided further convictions for fifteen years. 105 But for petitioners who fell
between the statutory bookends, no relief was available.
The court of appeals agreed that it seemed counterintuitive to “provide a form of
relief to convicted persons when that relief is unavailable to persons who have not
been convicted.” 106 Unfortunately, because the petitioner had not raised his
constitutional argument in the proceedings below, the court declined to decide the
issue.107 Taken with Arnold, however, Zagorac signaled a sea change in expungement
law. It is against this backdrop of litigation that the state legislature acted, first in 2011
and then during the 118th General Assembly, crafting a statutory alternative for
ex-convicts who could not satisfy the stringent requirements of chapter 5.108
IV. A COMPREHENSIVE OVERHAUL: PARSING IND. CODE § 35-38-9
In 2013, under the leadership of Representative Jud McMillin (R-Brookville), the
General Assembly enacted a comprehensive expungement bill with wide bipartisan
support.109 During the 2013 legislative recess, Representative McMillin met with
government officials and attorneys across the state; they discussed the strengths of
the new law and areas where it might be tweaked to simplify the process. 110
Representative McMillin brought these recommendations back to the statehouse; the
statute was amended as of March 26, 2014,111 and is in effect as of this writing.

105. See § 35-38-5-5(b) (2008).
106. Zagorac, 943 N.E.2d at 394.
107. Id.
108. The General Assembly passed a stopgap “Restricted Access to Criminal Records”
statute in 2011; this statute created additional opportunities for persons convicted of low-level
crimes to seek expungement after an eight-year waiting period. Act of May 10, 2011, No. 194,
2011 Ind. Acts 2489 (codified as amended at IND. CODE §§ 35-38-5-5.5, -8-1 to -7 (Supp. 2011)
(repealed 2013)). The 2011 statute met with mixed reviews: as Nicole Porter, state advocacy
coordinator for the D.C.-based Sentencing Project, observed, “[Indiana] passed a law that only
expunges very low-level offenders after eight years. . . . It’s good that [Indiana] just passed that
policy, but there’s a lot of work that still needs to be done.” New Indiana Law Lets Ex-Offenders
Close Records, HERALD BULL. (July 5, 2011), http://www.heraldbulletin.com/archives
/article_67baf5d0-f208-5a39-b849-77877d9c092c.html.
109. H.B. 1482, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013). As amended, the bill passed
the Indiana Senate with a vote of 39 to 11; it passed the House with a vote of 78 to 19. Action
List: House Bill 1482, IND. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.in.gov/apps/lsa/session/billwatch
/billinfo?year=2013&request=getActions&doctype=HB&docno=1482. Andrew Cullen of the
Indiana Public Defender Council observed that expungement “brings folks who are often at
different ends of the political spectrum together. . . . Legislators of a conservative nature believe
in redemption while legislators of a more liberal nature believe in the concept of second chances.”
Marilyn Odendahl, Giving Felons a Chance To Wipe Their Records Clean, IND. LAW. (Feb. 27.
2013), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/article/print?articleId=30843.
110. Hannah Troyer, Bill That Tweaks Expungement Law Headed to Full House,
THESTATEHOUSEFILE.COM (Jan. 15, 2014), http://thestatehousefile.com/bill-tweaks
-expungement-law-headed-full-house/14464/.
111. Act of Mar. 26, 2014, No. 181, 2014 Ind. Acts. 2291 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of IND. CODE tit. 35 (Supp. 2014)).
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Under section 1 of Indiana’s amended expungement statute (chapter 9 of title 35,
article 38), persons who have been arrested but not convicted or whose convictions
have been vacated on appeal may petition for expungement not earlier than one year
after their date of arrest or the final order vacating their conviction.112 For qualifying
petitioners who have no criminal charges pending, courts are required to grant
expungement: as a practical matter, this means that no information concerning the
expunged arrest may be retained in the Indiana Central Repository or in “any other
alphabetically arranged criminal history information system” maintained by an Indiana
law enforcement agency. 113 However, relief under section 1 is not exhaustive: law
enforcement agencies and courts are not required to alter their internal records, and
records pertaining to pretrial diversion or deferral programs are not affected.114
The next four sections of chapter 9 present the requirements for expungement of
conviction records. 115 Sections 2 and 3 describe mandatory expungement, while
sections 4 and 5 describe discretionary expungement. 116 Certain baseline
requirements apply across all four sections. 117 Each section establishes a waiting
period triggered by either the date of conviction or the completion of the sentence.118
Under the 2013 version of the statute, all petitioners were required to pay a civil filing

112. § 35-38-9-1 (Supp. 2014). The prosecuting attorney may agree in writing to an earlier
petition. § 35-38-9-1(b) (Supp. 2014).
113. § 35-38-9-1(f) (Supp. 2014). Under the 2013 version of the statute, in which a
substantially similar process was known as “sealing,” a defendant who had survived two mistrials
and for whom all charges were dropped filed a petition to seal her criminal history. The court
confirmed that it had no discretion but was required to seal the petitioner’s records based on the
qualifying factors of section 1. See Madeline Buckley, Prosecutors Rip Indiana’s New ‘2nd
Chance Law,’ IND. ECON. DIG. (Oct. 30, 2013, 7:28 PM), http://www.indianaeconomicdigest.net
/main.asp?SectionID=31&subsectionID=224&articleID=71892.
114. § 35-38-9-1(f)(1)–(3) (Supp. 2014). Furthermore, as of the 2014 amendments, if a
former arrestee files suit in a case in which expunged arrest records could provide a complete
defense, that former arrestee has the burden to prove that the contents of her records would not
exonerate the defendant under the circumstances of her case. See § 35-38-9-1(g) (Supp. 2014).
115. Strangely, sections 2 and 3 make no mention of juvenile delinquency adjudications.
In fact, after three legislative endeavors in 2011, 2013, and 2014, juvenile record expungement
remains the province of an older statute that affords unchecked discretion to trial courts. See
infra notes 206–16 and accompanying text.
116. The mandatory expungement provisions stipulate that a court “shall” order the
conviction records of a qualifying petitioner expunged. E.g., § 35-38-9-2(d) (Supp. 2014). The
discretionary provisions indicate that a court “may” order the records expunged. E.g.,
§ 35-38-9-4(e) (Supp. 2014). Chapter 9 addresses misdemeanor and felony convictions only:
in a separate Act enacted in 2013, prior law that automatically restricted access to infraction
records after five years was replaced with new statutory language requiring petitions similar
to those for misdemeanor expungement. Act of Apr. 29, 2013, No. 112, § 7, 2013 Ind. Acts
811, 814–18 (codified as amended at IND. CODE § 34-28-5-15 (Supp. 2014)).
117. Qualifying petitioners must prove by preponderance of the evidence that they have no
charges pending against them and they must have paid all fines, fees, court costs, and
restitution obligations. E.g., § 35-38-9-2(d) (Supp. 2014).
118. These waiting periods can be adjusted with the prosecutor’s written consent. E.g.,
§ 35-38-9-2(b), (d)(4) (Supp. 2014).
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fee. 119 The statute expressly denied a waiver or reduction for indigence. 120 The
waiver proscription was among the provisions eliminated by the 2014 amendments:
according to the Division of State Court Administration, low-income petitioners may
now qualify for a waiver just as in other civil actions.121
Under the mandatory expungement procedures, persons convicted of
misdemeanors (including Class D or Level 6 felonies reduced to Class A
misdemeanors122) may petition for expungement not earlier than five years after their
date of conviction, assuming they have received no additional convictions during that
period.123 The policy is similar for persons convicted of most nonviolent Class D or
Level 6 felonies, although they have a waiting period of eight years.124

119. Indiana’s civil filing fee, which includes a baseline fee increased by administrative and
pro bono service fees, currently stands at $141. See § 33-37-4-4 (Supp. 2014); LILIA G. JUDSON,
DIV. OF STATE COURT ADMIN., IND. SUPREME COURT, INDIANA TRIAL COURT FEE MANUAL 7
(2013), available at http://www.state.in.us/judiciary/admin/files/pubs-fee-manual.pdf.
120. E.g., § 35-38-9-2(c) (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014).
121. See Marcia Oddi, Ind. Courts—The New Expungement Changes Took Effect March
26th. What Are They?, IND. L. BLOG (Apr. 3, 2014, 10:27 AM), http://indianalawblog.com
/archives/2014/04/ind_courts_the_47.html. Civil litigants in Indiana may ordinarily avoid
court costs by declaring under oath that they are indigent. Litigants who are represented by
Indiana Legal Services, a statewide legal aid program, may qualify for a waiver if their
attorneys vouch for their indigency. § 33-37-3-2 (2008).
122. On May 6, 2013, Governor Pence signed H.B. 1006 into law: effective July 1, 2014,
the statute overhauled Indiana’s sentencing requirements. Act of May 6, 2013, No. 158, 2013
Ind. Acts 1155 (codified as amended in scattered sections of IND. CODE (Supp. 2014)). The
overhaul introduced harsher punishments and fewer early-release options for violent criminals
and sex offenders while reducing the penalties for nonviolent crimes and empowering judges
with greater discretion to place low-level offenders into community-based correction
programs or substance abuse treatment rather than the state penitentiary system. Maureen
Hayden, New Sentencing Laws Prompt Local Worries Around State, GREENSBURG DAILY NEWS
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.greensburgdailynews.com/local/x2117361225/New-sentencing
-laws-prompt-local-worries-around-state.
One consequence of this overhaul was a change in the way felonies are graded: the former
four-tier system (A–D) was converted to a six-tier system (1–6). IND. LAW BLOG, CRIMINAL
CODE REVISION BILL SUMMARY (2013), available at http://indianalawblog.com/documents
/Criminal%20Code%20Revision%20bill_%20Summary%20document-1.pdf. Under the new
scheme, Class D felonies are classified as Level 6, Class C felonies are classified as Level 5,
Class B felonies are divided between Levels 3 and 4 based on severity, and Class A felonies
are divided between Levels 1 and 2 based on severity. Id. Misdemeanors are unaffected. Id.
The 2014 amendments to the expungement statute accounted for this change: as a result,
sections 2 through 5 reference both the old four-tier system and the new six-tier system.
123. § 35-38-9-2(b), (d)(4) (Supp. 2014). The prosecutor may consent in writing to an
earlier period. The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently clarified that persons who previously
obtained court-ordered dismissal of misdemeanor convictions may qualify for subsequent
expungement. In J.B. v. State, the court noted that a judicially ordered dismissal would have
been “meaningless if the records concerning that conviction were to remain accessible,” and
it could not “conclude that the General Assembly would have intended such a result.” No.
53A01-1408-CR-367, 2015 WL 1035487, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015).
124. § 35-38-9-3(c), (e)(4) (Supp. 2014). Again, the prosecutor may consent to an earlier
period. Although section 3 excludes from coverage those felony convictions stemming from
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Under the discretionary expungement procedures of section 4, persons convicted
of many nonviolent felonies may file their petitions at the later of eight years after
their date of conviction or three years after completing their sentence, unless the
prosecutor consents in writing to an earlier period. 125 Section 5 enumerates the
requirements for expungement of more serious felonies, including those committed
by an elected official or those resulting in “serious bodily injury.”126 Petitioners must
wait until the later of ten years after their date of conviction or five years after
completing their sentence, unless the prosecutor consents in writing to an earlier
period. 127 Unique to section 5, petitioners must obtain the prosecutor’s written
consent to proceed with the expungement process even if they satisfy the statutory
waiting period.128

“bodily injury to another person,” § 35-38-9-3(b)(3), the Court of Appeals of Indiana held in
a March 2015 opinion that “facts from the same incident that do not result in a felony
conviction cannot be taken into consideration when determining whether a person is
disqualified from expungement.” Trout v. State, No. 12A04-1409-MI-403, 2015 WL 1186077,
at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2015). In Trout, the petitioner was convicted of criminal
recklessness with a deadly weapon and pointing a firearm, both Class D felonies. He was
acquitted of attempted murder. Although the petitioner did not dispute that he shot and injured
his victim, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that it could not “turn
a blind eye to the facts of the entire case.” Id. at *3. The language of the expungement statute
is clear: “a person is ineligible for mandatory expungement if they were convicted of a felony
and that felony resulted in bodily injury to another person.” Id. (emphasis added). In Trout’s
case, whatever other misconduct he may have engaged in during the course of the crime, his
only convictions fit the requirements for expungement under section 3.
125. § 35-38-9-4(c) (Supp. 2014). The statute does not identify precisely what constitutes
completion of a sentence—but qualifying language in the 2013 version that required
petitioners to complete any term of supervised release was eliminated by the 2014
amendments. Compare § 35-38-9-4(c) (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014), with § 35-38-9-4(c)
(Supp. 2014). See also Alvey v. State, No. 20A04-1310-MI-533, 2014 WL 3857228 (Ind. Ct.
App. Aug. 6, 2014) (affirming denial of expungement petition where petitioner twice violated
the terms of his probation but recognizing that petitioner may seek relief under the more liberal
standards of the revised statute), aff’g 10 N.E.3d 1031 (2014).
Under current law, petitioners must also prove that they have not been convicted of any
crime within the past eight years, though the prosecutor may override this requirement.
§ 35-38-9-4(e)(4) (Supp. 2014).
126. § 35-38-9-5(a) (Supp. 2014). The Code defines “serious bodily injury” to include
injuries that cause a substantial risk of death or impairment, disfigurement, unconsciousness,
extreme pain, or miscarriage. § 35-31.5-2-292 (Supp. 2014). While such language conveys
gruesome imagery, courts have construed the term broadly. See, e.g., Lipka v. State, 479
N.E.2d 575 (Ind. 1985) (quarter-inch laceration in proximity of vital organs, without actually
impacting those organs, constituted serious bodily injury); Chidebelu-Eze v. State, No.
49A02-1308-CR-720, 2014 WL 2192382 (Ind. Ct. App. May 27, 2014) (unpublished slip
opinion) (head-butt resulting in concussion constituted serious bodily injury).
127. § 35-38-9-5(c) (Supp. 2014). Like the other sections, section 5 has a “clean hands”
requirement: petitioners must prove that they have not been convicted of any crime within the past
ten years, though the prosecutor may override this requirement. § 35-38-9-5(e)(4) (Supp. 2014).
128. § 35-38-9-5(e)(5) (Supp. 2014).
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Under Indiana law, no relief is available for persons formerly convicted of official
misconduct, kidnapping, human trafficking, homicide, or sex crimes.129
The results of a successful petition for expungement hinge on the grade of the
underlying offense. For section 2 misdemeanors and section 3 Class D / Level 6
felonies, courts must order the Department of Corrections, the BMV, and other law
enforcement or treatment agencies to prohibit the release of affected records except
to police or persons with a court order.130 Courts must also order the Indiana Central
Repository to seal the records, and they must ensure that related judicial opinions are
redacted.131 Notably, Indiana’s expungement statute—unlike statutes in some other
jurisdictions132—does not mandate that expunged records be destroyed. This was not
a legislative oversight: the statute provides for a number of circumstances in which
expunged records may be disclosed. For instance, a prosecutor may obtain expunged
records from the Central Repository if she requires them to carry out of her official
duties and if she obtains a court order.133 The statute provides similar access for

129. § 35-38-9-5(b) (Supp. 2014). Presumably the public would balk at expungement for
persons convicted of murder or rape; hesitation might well be warranted for such serious
crimes. That said, it seems less obvious to categorically withhold relief from persons convicted
of official misconduct as defined under Indiana law. See § 35-44.1-1-1 (Supp. 2014) (defining
official misconduct to include knowing commission of an offense by a public servant,
acceptance of a bribe, transacting based on confidential information, or failure to deliver public
records to a successor servant); see also State v. Dugan, 793 N.E.2d 1034 (Ind. 2003) (allowing
charge of official misconduct for state excise officer who accepted modest kickbacks from
liquor merchandiser).
130. § 35-38-9-6(a)(1) (Supp. 2014).
131. § 35-38-9-6(a)(2), (c) (Supp. 2014).
132. See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 920 (2014) (“An order for the expungement of
juvenile court records must be in writing and, except as hereinafter provided, must require that
the clerk of court destroy all records relating to the conduct or conditions referred to in the
motion for expungement, including but not limited to pleadings, exhibits, reports, minute
entries, correspondence, and all other documents.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7606(d)(3)–(4)
(Supp. 2013) (“Inspection of the expungement order and the certificate may be permitted only
upon petition by the person who is the subject of the case or by the court if the court finds that
inspection of the documents is necessary to serve the interest of justice. . . . All other court
documents in a case that are subject to an expungement order shall be destroyed.”). But see In
re Kollman, 46 A.3d 1247, 1254 (N.J. 2012) (“When a court orders expungement, criminal
records are extracted and isolated, but not destroyed . . . .” (citation omitted) (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:52-1 (2005))).
133. § 35-38-9-6(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2014). The requirement of a court order may provide
some reassurance for formerly convicted persons who might worry about the vague
prosecutorial power to obtain records if “needed to carry out [their] official duties.” Yet in
subsection (d), the statute provides that “[n]otwithstanding subsection (b), a prosecuting
attorney may submit a written application to a court that granted an expungement petition . . .
to gain access to any records that were permanently sealed . . . if the records are relevant in a
new prosecution.” If the prosecutor shows that the records are “relevant,” an undefined term
in the statute, the court is then required to release the records to the prosecutor, who may
introduce them into evidence in the new proceeding. § 35-38-9-6(d) (Supp. 2014). As a
practical matter, then, a former offender’s expunged records may well come back to haunt him
if he finds himself at odds with the law once more, even if he is not actually convicted of a
subsequent offense.
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defense attorneys, probation departments, and federal investigative agencies, and it
likewise provides access for persons who require expunged records to comply with
the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act and its companion
regulations.134 As of 2014, the statute also provides that expunged records may be
released to the state board of law examiners or its employees for the purpose of
determining whether a bar applicant possesses “good moral character” (the so-called
“character-and-fitness” test).135
For section 4 and 5 felonies, arrest and conviction records remain in the public
domain, but courts will order these records to be marked as expunged. 136 Law
enforcement and other agencies must add an entry to their databases indicating that
the records have been marked as expunged.137
Perhaps the most critical, yet easily overlooked, element of the statute is the
“one-bite-at-the-apple” limitation of section 9(i). This provision stipulates that
petitioners may generally qualify for expungement only once in a lifetime.138 If a
petitioner has convictions in multiple counties, she must file in each county within a
one-year period. 139 If her petition is denied, she may file a subsequent petition
covering those offenses she originally sought to expunge, although in cases of
discretionary expungement (sections 4 and 5), the petitioner must wait three years
before submitting a subsequent petition.140 Under the 2013 version of the law, the
one-bite-at-the-apple limitation was particularly severe for low-income, pro se
petitioners: it permitted only one petition in a lifetime, and it made no
accommodation for excusable neglect or an honest mistake (for example, failing to
list an old-and-cold offense or omitting a mandatory element of the petition).141 The
2014 amendments made this provision fairer for pro se petitioners: now, a court may
permit a petitioner to file a subsequent petition with respect to convictions not
originally included if the court finds that the petitioner intended to comply with the
statute’s requirement but failed due to excusable neglect or circumstances beyond
her control.142 Even so, courts have discretion to permit or deny subsequent petitions
based on “the best interests of justice.”143 Because the amended language is quite
new, no appellate courts have reviewed a denial of subsequent expungement for
abuse of discretion—but it seems that results may vary across the state given the
legislature’s failure to supply particular criteria and given that some judges are
publicly opposed to the law.144

134. § 35-38-9-6(a)(2)(B)–(D), (F) (Supp. 2014); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5104 (2012)
(discussing background check and other requirements for loan origination licenses); FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, at V-14.1 (2014), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/pdf/V-14.1.pdf.
135. § 35-38-9-6(a)(2)(E) (Supp. 2014).
136. § 35-38-9-7(b) (Supp. 2014).
137. § 35-38-9-7(c) (Supp. 2014).
138. § 35-38-9-9(h) (Supp. 2014).
139. Id.
140. § 35-38-9-9(i) (Supp. 2014).
141. § 35-38-9-9(j) (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014).
142. § 35-38-9-9(j) (Supp. 2014).
143. Id.
144. See Prosecutors: Expungement Law Has Good, Bad Sides, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J. (July
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The final sections of chapter 9 represent a legislative effort to put some teeth into
the new statute. Section 10 clarifies that discrimination on the basis of an expunged
record is unlawful.145 Now, job applications that ask about criminal histories may do
so only in terms that “exclude expunged convictions or arrests.” 146 Persons who
discriminate on the basis of an expunged record commit a Class C infraction and may
be held in contempt of court. 147 Victims of such discrimination may sue for
injunctive relief.148 Section 11, the final section of the statute, was added by the 2014
amendments: it provides that a defendant may not waive the right to expungement
via a plea agreement and that purported waivers are void as against public policy.149
V. THE AFTERMATH OF CHAPTER 9: PUBLIC PRAISE, PROSECUTORIAL PERPLEXITY
The passage of the 2013 expungement statute generated ample publicity, with
small law firms in particular investing in advertisements and editorials to attract new
clients. 150 Andre Patterson, outreach coordinator for the Office of Diversity and

20, 2014), http://www.ibj.com/prosecutors-expungement-law-has-good-bad-sides/PARAMS
/article/48674 [hereinafter Prosecutors on Expungement] (“Morgan Superior Court Judge G.
Thomas Gray, a former prosecutor, said he dislikes the expungement process and objects to a
provision that says victims can address the court, but the judge cannot consider their testimony
if the expungement fits the statute.”).
145. § 35-38-9-10(b) (Supp. 2014). The statute prohibits suspension, expulsion, refusal to
employ, refusal to admit, refusal to license, and any other discrimination on the basis of sealed
or expunged records. Id.
146. § 35-38-9-10(d) (Supp. 2014).
147. § 35-38-9-10(f) (Supp. 2014). Elsewhere in the Code, a Class C infraction is defined
as a civil offense with a penalty of up to $500. § 34-28-5-4(c) (2008). Funds collected through
the administration of such a penalty are deposited into the state’s general fund. § 34-28-5-5(c)
(2008). Contempt is a somewhat looser concept: “indirect contempt,” most applicable here,
applies to willful disobedience of a process or order and may give rise to a fine, imprisonment,
or both. §§ 34-47-3-1, -6 (2008). In Davis v. Sponhauer, the court of appeals held that
punishment for contempt is left to the “sound discretion of the trial court.” 574 N.E.2d 292,
302 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
148. § 35-38-9-10(f) (Supp. 2014). Almost simultaneously with passage of the 2013
expungement statute, and as a companion provision to the section 10 remedies, the General
Assembly modified title 24 trade regulations concerning the management and dissemination
of criminal records. Act of Apr. 29, 2013, No. 112, §§ 1–6, 2013 Ind. Acts 811, 811–14
(codified as amended at IND. CODE §§ 24-4-18-1 to -8 (Supp. 2014)). Per the amended
provisions, criminal history providers must not knowingly release information pertaining to
expunged records. § 24-4-18-6(a)(1) (Supp. 2014). A knowing violation is actionable as a
“deceptive act.” § 24-4-18-8(a) (Supp. 2014). Persons injured by such an act are entitled to
sue for damages. § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (Supp. 2014). The Assembly’s choice to apply civil deception
remedies in cases of unlawful dissemination is puzzling. It appears that a plaintiff seeking to
recover damages would be required to show that she relied to her detriment on an “uncured or
incurable” deceptive act. Id. Perhaps a plaintiff who was denied employment due to a
wrongfully disseminated record would have a justiciable cause of action.
149. § 35-38-9-11 (Supp. 2014). It seems that this provision may represent a partial
legislative response to arguments raised by Prosecutor Steve Sonnega in the Combs dispute.
See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Indianapolis Expungement Law Attorneys, WINKLERYORKLAW.COM,
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Multicultural Affairs at Indiana University–Purdue University Fort Wayne, noted
that more than 160 people registered for a training session on the new law, while
others waited in line for hours to attend the session. 151 Marion County Deputy
Prosecutor Andrew Fogle said that his office received between thirty and forty
petitions within the first two months.152
Despite the enthusiasm of petitioners, some legal professionals raised concerns
about the operation or potential consequences of the statute. In a July 2013 interview,
Judge Fran Gull of the Allen Superior Court cautioned that courts did not have a
sufficient framework in place to process the potential deluge of petitions.153 She also
warned that petitioners should seek qualified counsel before filing, given the complex
eligibility requirements and the “one-bite-at-the-apple” provision. 154 Allen County
Deputy Prosecutor Michael McAlexander echoed Judge Gull’s concerns, observing
that an ex-offender in her early twenties might hesitate to petition the court if there was
a chance she might encounter legal problems later in life.155 Deputy Prosecutor Fogle
raised a different concern: while the statute requires the prosecuting attorney to “inform
the victim of the victim’s rights . . . by contacting the victim at the victim’s last known
address,”156 such a feat is easier said than done for decades-old convictions.157
Other prosecutors expressed concern less with the statute’s practical workings and
more with its policy implications. Shelby County Prosecutor Kent Apsley remarked
derisively that “[f]rom an offender’s standpoint, this law is, obviously, a huge

http://www.winkleryorklaw.com/expungement/; Peterson Waggoner & Perkins, LLP,
Expungement of Criminal Records in Indiana, YOUTUBE (Aug. 16, 2013),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ld5TAN2wlaI.
151. Frank Gray, Thirst Acute for Info on Sealing Crime Files, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE,
Oct. 15, 2013, at 1C.
152. Ryckaert, supra note 20. In a public relations debacle, between two hundred and three
hundred people crowded into the Marion County Clerk’s Office on July 1, 2013, believing that
expungement was available for one day only. Dave Stafford, Complexity of New Expungement
Law Raises Questions, IND. LAW. (July 17, 2013), http://www.theindianalawyer.com
/complexity-of-new-expungement-law-raises-questions/PARAMS/article/31913.
153. Law Allowing Expungement Creating Legal Confusion, POST-TRIB., July 27, 2013,
http://posttrib.suntimes.com/news/21566608-418/law-allowing-expungement-creating-legalconfusion.html.
154. Id. The statute in effect at the time of Judge Gull’s comments offered no apparent
relief for pro se petitioners who filed improperly or who inadvertently omitted an offense. As
amended in 2014, the statute offers higher tolerance for excusable neglect, although the
general rule of once-in-a-lifetime expungement remains the law. See supra notes 141–43 and
accompanying text.
155. Id. McAlexander’s concern is grounded in a practical understanding of recidivism: over
one-third of Indiana’s adult inmates are reincarcerated within three years of their release. IND.
DEP’T OF CORR., ADULT RECIDIVISM RATES (2012), available at http://www.in.gov/idoc
/files/2012_Adult_Recidivism_Summary.pdf. Even if a youthful ex-offender has every intention
of staying on course for the duration of her life, the idea of a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity can
chill young adults facing decades of experiences, surprises, and, inevitably, mistakes.
156. IND. CODE § 35-38-9-8(e) (Supp. 2014).
157. Stafford, supra note 152. For crimes committed long before digitized records, tracking
down victims may prove impossible, especially for rural prosecutors’ offices with small staffs
and limited resources.
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benefit. They can essentially wipe out a whole lifetime of crime.” 158 Apsley
described the “big losers” as employers who are prohibited, under section 10, from
asking about nonexpunged crimes. 159 Allen County Prosecutor Karen Richards
agreed that employers have a legitimate interest in making informed decisions.160
While most criticism of the expungement law has fallen along predictable policy
lines, some critics have posed more nuanced legal arguments. On October 18, 2013,
Morgan County Prosecutor Steve Sonnega asked Judge Matthew Hanson to declare
the statute unconstitutional. 161 Sonnega attacked the statute on several bases: he
argued, for instance, that the statute undermined judicial discretion through its
mandatory expungement provisions, 162 and he contended that the legislature’s
introduction of expungement law unconstitutionally interfered with plea bargain
“contracts” established under prior law. 163 The crux of Sonnega’s argument,
however, was that the expungement statute violates the state constitution’s
requirement that victims of crimes must be treated with dignity.164 While victims are

158. Paul Gable, Apsley Uncertain of New State Law, SHELBYVILLE NEWS, Aug. 17, 2013,
available at 2013 WLNR 20466953.
159. Id. Jackson County Prosecutor AmyMarie Travis also expressed concern that
ex-convicts might conceal past indiscretions, such as internal theft, from potential employers,
though she admitted that she would urge her own family members to take advantage of the law
if it would benefit them. Aubrey Woods, Indiana Expungement Law Gives Woman a Fresh Start,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Mar. 30, 2014, 3:05 PM), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local
/indiana/2014/03/30/indiana-expungement-law-gives-woman-fresh-start/7084151/.
160. Editorial, Expunge with Care, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 2013, at 6A. In fact,
the legislature did take account of employer concerns in the new statute, providing that
expunged records are inadmissible in negligent hiring suits. See § 35-38-9-10(g) (Supp. 2014).
This safeguard may not address all employment-related issues, but it should soothe the
trepidations of human resource managers fearful of lawsuits.
One might argue that the concerns voiced by Prosecutors Apsley and Richards overlook
the possibility of bona fide rehabilitation. Recidivism in Indiana declined five percent from
2011 to 2012, paralleling similar and even sharper declines in other states. Fewer Reformed
Criminals Return to Prison, WNDU.COM (Mar. 6, 2013, 7:05 AM), http://www.wndu.com
/home/headlines/Fewer-reformed-criminals-return-to-prison-195527471.html
[hereinafter
WNDU Article]; Letter from Danny K. Davis, supra note 82. State-sponsored courses in
substance abuse awareness, anger management, and vocational training may be partly to credit
for the decline; federal investment through the Second Chance Act has undoubtedly helped as
well. WNDU Article, supra; see also Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122
Stat. 657 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). That said, over one-third
of Indiana’s adult inmates are reincarcerated within three years of their release, so Apsley’s
and Richards’s concerns are not without merit. See supra note 155; but see supra notes 49–50
(arguing that elimination of rap-sheet stigma may offset the economic desperation that often
leads to recidivism). It is worth noting that if an ex-convict recidivates within a three-year
period, he will probably not qualify for expungement anyway, as the statutory waiting period
for the lowest-level offenses is five years. § 35-38-9-2(b), (d)(4) (Supp. 2014).
161. Tim Evans, Law Erasing Criminal Records Faces Challenge, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Oct. 28, 2013, at A1.
162. Combs v. State, No. 55C01-1308-MI-1392, slip op. paras. 9–10 (Morgan Cnty. Cir.
Ct. Oct. 28, 2013).
163. Id. slip. op. para. 25.
164. Id. slip. op. para. 51; see also IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b) (“Victims of crime, as defined
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invited to submit statements supporting or opposing the expungement petition, “the
law does not give a judge any leeway to consider that input.”165
In an October 28 order, Judge Hanson rejected most of Sonnega’s arguments.
However, he agreed that section 9’s solicitation of victim input is incompatible with
the earlier provisions that “do not require a consideration of a victim’s statement
before they ‘shall’ grant an expungement.”166 Thus, Judge Hanson concluded, “the
statute is ineffectual when it comes to victim’s [sic] rights and therefore violates the
Indiana Constitution.” 167 In spite of his conclusion, Judge Hanson did not strike
down any portion of the statute—because the case at hand concerned a DUI offense
for which “there really [was] no victim.”168
Judge Hanson’s decision to forego invalidation in spite of his misgivings was an
eminently reasonable expression of judicial restraint.169 Moreover, it is not clear that
Sonnega had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute in the first
instance.170 Citing to a recent Indiana Supreme Court case, Professor Joel Schumm
of the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law observed that “the
State is the State,” and the “Attorney General, the State official charged with
defending the constitutionality of state statutes, cannot be too pleased that the State
(through a deputy prosecutor) is alleging a statute unconstitutional.”171

by law, shall have the right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect throughout the
criminal justice process.”).
165. Evans, supra note 161.
166. Combs, No. 55C01-1308-MI-1392, slip op. para. 47. Judge Hanson’s order came
down months before the 2014 amendments were enacted. Under the version of the statute in
effect at the time of Judge Hanson’s order, section 9(d) provided that “[t]he court shall consider
the victims statement before making its determination.” The General Assembly eliminated this
language in 2014, but the statute still welcomes victim input—and arguably, Sonnega’s
complaint is stronger now that the statute does not require judges to consider the input they
receive. As Sonnega himself observed in a July 2014 interview, “There’s not much leeway for
a prosecutor or judge, and granting these [petitions] becomes perfunctory, and that bothers
me.” Prosecutors on Expungement, supra note 144.
167. Combs, No. 55C01-1308-MI-1392, slip op. para. 53.
168. Id. slip op. para. 54.
169. To strike down a statute on the basis of harm to a nonexistent party would seem to
violate the Indiana Supreme Court’s dictate that “[w]hen a statute can be construed to support
its constitutionality, such construction must be adopted.” Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64, 71
(Ind. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute, IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6 (2008).
Furthermore, while Indiana’s constitution lacks a “case or controversy” provision equivalent
to the requirement of Article III, the Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that “the
separation of powers language in Art. III, § 1 fulfills an analogous function” in judicial activity
or inactivity. Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 336–
37 (Ind. 1994); see also IND. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The powers of the Government are divided
into three separate departments . . . and no person, charged with official duties under one of
these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution
expressly provided.”).
170. See Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ind. 1990) (describing
standing as a principle confining courts to “resolving real controversies in which the
complaining party has a demonstrable injury”).
171. Joel Schumm, State Constitutional Twilight Zone: Judges and Prosecutors Are
Arguing Statutes Are Unconstitutional, IND. L. BLOG (Sept. 25, 2013, 12:27 PM),
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Beyond the procedural impropriety of Sonnega’s claim, however, its merits
warrant additional consideration. In concluding that “the dictates of sections 2–5 do
not require a consideration of a victim’s statement before they ‘shall’ grant an
expungement,”172 Judge Hanson appears to have misread the statute. While sections
2 and 3 require a judge to grant expungement for qualifying petitioners (“shall
order”), sections 4 and 5 are discretionary (“may order”), and section 5 requires the
petitioner to obtain the prosecuting attorney’s consent.173
Furthermore, both Sonnega and Judge Hanson seem to have assumed that victims
have a stake in expungement proceedings that must be weighed against the interests
of petitioners. Yet the statute is structured so that expungement is available only after
a petitioner has completed her sentence,174 and the statute requires petitioners to have
satisfied all costs, fees, and other financial obligations in connection with their
conviction. 175 Restitution, if demanded, has been paid; time, if ordered, has been
served. 176 The individual sentencing provisions of the Code make no mention of
criminal records: as Judge Hanson himself suggested, these records are procedural
(“norm[s] of doing business”) rather than substantive.177 Crimes and sentences are
defined by the state legislature, a body democratically elected by a constituency that
includes the victims of crimes. Once a convict has served out his sentence, he has
done all that the law requires of him. Victims are constitutionally entitled to respect
throughout prosecutions, and they are entitled to be present at public hearings178—
but they are not entitled to shape the outcomes of procedures, particularly for
offenders who have served their time.179

http://indianalawblog.com/archives/2013/09/ind_courts_stat_61.html (quoting Becker v.
State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 698 (Ind. 2013)).
172. Combs, No. 55C01-1308-MI-1392, slip op. para. 47.
173. See §§ 35-38-9-2(d), -3(e), -4(e), -5(e) (Supp. 2014).
174. For example, section 3—expungement of Class D and Level 6 felonies—provides that
eight years must have elapsed since the date of the petitioner’s conviction. § 35-38-9-3(c)
(Supp. 2014). Yet prison terms for Class D and Level 6 felons range from six months to three
years, with the current advisory sentence being just one year. § 35-50-2-7(a)–(b) (Supp. 2014).
The statute does provide that the prosecuting attorney may consent in writing to an earlier
period. E.g., § 35-38-9-2(b) (Supp. 2014). However, it seems inconceivable that a prosecutor
would consent to expungement while the petitioner is still serving time.
175. §§ 35-38-9-2(d)(3), -3(e)(3), -4(e)(3), -5(e)(3) (Supp. 2014).
176. Victims of heinous crimes may reasonably feel that no penalty, however severe, could
offset the harm that has been done to them. But expungement is not available for the most
serious crimes, such as homicide or rape. Furthermore, for victims who cannot obtain
sufficient relief through the operation of criminal law, tort law provides time-honored
remedies. See Allgood v. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 836 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ind. 2005) (“Making
a party ‘whole’ is the province of tort law . . . .”).
177. See Combs, No. 55C01-1308-MI-1392, slip op. para. 26.
178. IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b). The constitutional provision, however, pertains
specifically to prosecutions, and it refers to the adverse party as the “accused.” It is not clear
that this provision applies to postconviction hearings over procedural matters such as
expungement. Cf. § 35-40-5-5 (2008) (authorizing victim input at proceedings involving
sentencing and release but making no mention of expungement or criminal records).
179. In addition to the merits analysis, there are more practical considerations. As
Martinsville attorney Glen Koch II observed, the legislature “wanted to make [expungement]
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Although Judge Hanson left open the possibility that he would strike down the
expungement statute if a future challenge involved an identifiable victim, the court
of appeals likely foreclosed such a result in an April 2014 opinion.180 In Taylor v.
State, the court considered a petition filed by Jason Taylor to expunge a decade-old
misdemeanor conviction. Although Taylor met the requirements of section 2, the
Lake County Superior Court denied his petition after his former victim testified that
she “still suffers the effects of what [Taylor] did” and “believes that the punishment
should fit the crime.”181 The version of the expungement statute in effect at the time
of Taylor’s conviction included the language that most troubled Judge Hanson—that
the court “shall consider the victim’s statement before making its determination.”182
Chief Judge Vaidik, writing for the panel, agreed with Taylor that section 2
unambiguously requires expungement if the petitioner satisfies all the requirements,
and she pointed out that the use of “may” in sections 4 and 5 connotes legislative line
drawing between proceedings in which courts have discretion and those in which
they do not.183 Because Taylor satisfied the requirements of section 2, he was entitled
to expungement—and the lower court erred in denying him relief.184
Although the Taylor court did not evaluate constitutional arguments per se, its
straightforward enforcement of mandatory expungement over a former victim’s
protests renders it unlikely that a lower court will dare to strike the statute down.185
Taylor signals that Indiana’s expungement law is here to stay.

easy and keep the costs down so these cases could be handled without getting into some big,
drawn-out and expensive litigation.” Evans, supra note 161.
180. Taylor v. State, 7 N.E.3d 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
181. Id. at 364.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 365–66.
184. Id. at 367. An article in the Indianapolis Star published shortly after the Taylor
decision suggested that the appellate court’s ruling will provide clarity for lower courts that
may be reviewing expungement petitions filed under the 2013 version of the statute, with its
conflicting “shalls” (shall consider the victim’s statement, shall order the records expunged).
Quoting attorney Stephen Moell of Schererville, the article noted that Taylor “puts those who
filed for expungement under the initial version of the law on equal footing with those who file
now.” Tim Evans, Expungement Law Favors Reformed Criminals over Victims, Appeals Court
Says, INDYSTAR (Apr. 24, 2014, 5:51 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2014/04
/24/expungement-law-favors-criminals-victims-appeals-court-says/8096707/; see also Mallory
v. State, No. 20A03-1403-MI-76, 2014 WL 4049802 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2014) (citing Taylor
and holding that petitioner, who met all the requirements of section 35-38-9-3(e), was entitled to
expungement of Class D felony theft conviction against victims’ wishes).
185. Cf. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal District Judges
Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals 7 (John M. Olin Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 508, 2010) (“Except when they sit in a circuit with appellate judges who
share their ideological preferences, district judges must choose between deciding cases that
promote their ideological preferences and enjoying a high rate of affirmance. Since the former
choice just means reversal and ultimately the failure to promote their ideological preferences,
there is no choice at all. District judges will suppress their ideological leanings and decide
cases so as to avoid reversal.”).
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VI. RECOMMENDED REVISIONS
Indiana’s expungement law represents a significant effort to counter the
deleterious effects of rap-sheet stigma and to provide relief for ex-offenders who
seek to lead productive, prosocial lives. The 2013 legislation established a solid
statutory foundation; the 2014 amendments made the statute fairer and more
accessible. 186 The General Assembly should be commended for its bipartisan
commitment to second chances. That said, important legislation is often a work in
progress,187 and the expungement statute could benefit from additional revisions and
enhancements. 188 This final Part presents a variety of recommendations for the

186. For instance, the 2014 amendments eliminated the compulsory filing fee, see supra
note 121, and granted courts discretion to overlook excusable filing errors, see supra note 142.
187. Cf. Nicholas Bala, A Report from Canada’s ‘Gender War Zone’: Reforming the
Child-Related Provisions of the Divorce Act, 16 CAN. J. FAM. L. 163, 225 (1999) (“It must be
recognized that the reform of child related laws will always be a ‘work-in-progress,’ being
improved by legislators, judges and bureaucrats as more and better research becomes
available.”); Patrick O. Gudridge, Complexity and Contradiction in Florida Constitutional
Law, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 879, 927 (2010) (“Legislative drafters can hardly be expected to
monitor closely all parts of a bill and also its legislative history, at least in cases . . . in which
the content of legislation is a work in progress.”); Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Belonging:
Citizenship and Migration in the European Union and in Germany, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
330, 338 (2006) (“[T]he EU’s legal framework on nationality/citizenship and on migration
remains a highly contested work in progress.”); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Key Environmental
Legislation for Cuba’s Transition Period, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 331, 364 (2000) (“The
transition period in Cuba will likely be characterized by frequent and perhaps dramatic
changes in economic and political conditions. . . . Accordingly, the fundamental law must be
considered ‘work in progress’ legislation, and may expressly provide that it is subject to
periodic re-evaluation, at least during the first decade of the transition.”).
188. Four expungement-related bills were introduced to the General Assembly during the
2015 session: as of mid-March, two of those bills were proceeding through committee and will
likely merge into a uniform set of amendments to the expungement law later this spring.
Compare S.B. 287, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015), with H.B. 1302, 119th Gen
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015). Both bills would expand section 1 coverage to charges
without arrest and allegations of juvenile delinquency while broadening the mandatory
redaction of related judicial records. Both bills would also eliminate the requirement that
petitioners submit a certified driving record along with their petitions. The senate bill would
remove the filing fee altogether, while the house bill would require civil filing fees—with a
caveat that courts may reduce or waive the fees for indigent petitioners. The house bill would
eliminate the requirement that petitioners must have satisfied all fines, fees, costs, and
restitution obligations, while the senate bill would retain that requirement. The house bill
would withhold all expungement relief from persons who were convicted of two or more
felony offenses involving the use of a deadly weapon where such offenses were not committed
during a single crime. The house bill would also provide that prosecutors need not notify victims
of their rights—per section 8—in cases of mandatory expungement, while both bills would treat
a prosecutor’s failure to timely reply to an expungement petition as a waiver of any objections.
Both bills would add a new section 8.5 with guidance for petitioners who were convicted of
offenses punishable by indeterminate sentences. Finally, both bills would clarify that an
expungement case becomes confidential once the court issues an expungement order; however,
the house bill further clarifies that hearings conducted prior to that order are open to the public.
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General Assembly’s consideration. These recommendations fall into three general
categories—administrability, fairness, and effectiveness.
A. Administrability
Like courts across the nation, Indiana courts place a premium on judicial
efficiency.189 Overall, the expungement law is reasonably administrable: it provides
for explicit waiting periods,190 it enumerates the elements of a proper petition,191 and
it outlines remedies available in cases involving unlawful discrimination.192 Yet two
provisions of section 9 interfere with the efficient administration of the statute.
Subsection (c) provides that the prosecuting attorney may object to the petition, in
which case the court must set the matter for a hearing “not sooner than sixty (60)
days after service of the petition on the prosecuting attorney.” 193 Subsection (d)
invites victims of the underlying offense to submit oral or written statements in
response to the petition for expungement at the time of any such hearing.194 These
prosecutor/victim input provisions may offer some utility in higher-grade
expungement proceedings, where courts must exercise discretion to grant or deny
relief,195 but they simply do not comport with the language in sections 2 and 3. A
petitioner seeking expungement of a misdemeanor or Class D / Level 6 felony must
satisfy the waiting period and certain other requirements, but she requires the
blessing of neither the prosecutor nor the victim. If she satisfies the enumerated
requirements, the court shall grant her petition. On what basis, other than perhaps
procedural deficiency, can the prosecutor object?196 And what value can accrue from

189. See, e.g., Randolph Cnty. v. Chamness, 879 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Ind. 2008) (“Reliable
preferred venue rules increase judicial efficiency because a judge can focus on the merits of a
dispute rather than its relocation to a more convenient forum.”); Avery v. State, 484 N.E.2d
575, 576 (Ind. 1985) (“[W]hen both the State and the appellant have asked the trial judge to
certify the question and the trial judge has so certified on the basis that much time, effort and
money will be saved by obtaining the interlocutory ruling and where the issue is a single issue
which in reality needs no separate assignment of errors, it is in the interest of judicial efficiency
to grant the joint motion and proceed with the decision of the interlocutory appeal on the
merits.”); Ross v. Bachkurinskiy, 770 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“The trial court
must balance the need for an efficient judicial system with the judicial preference for deciding
disputes on the merits.”).
190. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-38-9-2(b), (d)(4) (Supp. 2014).
191. See § 35-38-9-8 (Supp. 2014).
192. But see infra Part VI.C (proposing supplemental or alternative remedies to increase
the statute’s effectiveness).
193. § 35-38-9-9(c) (Supp. 2014).
194. § 35-38-9-9(d) (Supp. 2014).
195. But see supra notes 174–179 (questioning whether victims should participate in the
expungement process at all).
196. Even procedural deficiency seems unlikely to justify a full-fledged hearing: a court
should be able to determine with relative ease whether the ex-offender’s verified petition
complies with the enumerated requirements of section 8. Perhaps the drafters were concerned
that petitioners may conceal more recent offenses in their effort to expunge older ones. Yet
such dishonesty seems improbable given that false affirmations in verified pleadings subject
the petitioner to the penalties for perjury. See IND. R. TRIAL P. 11(B). Furthermore, if the
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welcoming the victim’s input if expungement is a foregone conclusion? 197 To
prevent a slew of unnecessary hearings198 and to avoid mixed messages, the General
Assembly should amend section 9 so that the prosecutorial objection and victims’
input provisions apply—if at all199—to discretionary expungement only.
The General Assembly could also improve the statute’s administrability by
drafting guideposts to assist courts with discretionary expungement determinations.
Currently, the statute provides that a court “may order” expungement for petitioners
who satisfy the waiting period and other qualifications—yet it attaches no criteria to
that “may order.” 200 The Assembly could ensure more consistent and efficient
decision making by articulating factors that courts should consider. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania enumerated a list of such factors to reinforce its own
expungement doctrine:
These (factors) include the strength of the [state’s] case against the
petitioner, the reasons the [state] gives for wishing to retain the records,
the petitioner’s age, criminal record, and employment history, the length
of time that has elapsed between the arrest and the petition to expunge,

General Assembly wishes to include an additional safeguard, it could simply require
petitioners to obtain and submit a fingerprint background check as part of the expungement
process. See Inkless: Indiana’s Electronic Fingerprinting Network, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov
/isp/2674.htm. A background check requirement would be faster and more efficient for the
petitioner and the court, and it would enable low-income petitioners to proceed pro se rather than
seeking counsel for an unnecessary hearing.
197. If anything, such an invitation seems likely to stir up resent among victims, particularly
if they are unfamiliar with the statute and take the time to draft a thoughtful statement. Inviting
victims to opine on a process they cannot technically influence hardly seems compatible with the
constitutional mandate that victims “have the right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect
throughout the criminal justice process.” IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b).
198. For every one person convicted of a felony, ten are convicted of misdemeanors—
subject to mandatory expungement in Indiana. See Alexandra Natapoff, Why Misdemeanors
Aren’t So Minor, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2012, 11:33 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and
_politics/jurisprudence/2012/04/misdemeanors_can_have_major_consequences_for_the_peo
ple_charged_.html.
199. If the General Assembly insists on victim participation with respect to higher-grade
expungements, then the Assembly should consider an additional modification to section 8. As
written, the statute requires prosecuting attorneys to “inform the victim of the victim’s rights
. . . by contacting the victim at the victim’s last known address.” § 35-38-9-8(e) (Supp. 2014).
However, it may be impractical to contact victims of stale offenses that predated computerized
records or to notify all parties in cases involving multiple victims. See supra note 157 and
accompanying text. The General Assembly could account for such impracticability by drafting
more flexibly: “If time and circumstances permit, the prosecuting attorney shall inform the
victim of the victim’s rights if records of the victim’s last known address are reasonably
accessible or the prosecuting attorney otherwise has a reasonable ability to contact the victim.”
At a minimum, the Assembly should add language to prevent unnecessary holdups.
Kentucky’s expungement statute, which similarly requires notice to victims, provides a helpful
model: “Inability to locate the victim shall not delay the proceedings in the case or preclude
the holding of a hearing or the issuance of an order of expungement.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 431.078(3) (LexisNexis 2010).
200. See § 35-38-9-4(e), -5(e) (Supp. 2014).
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and the specific adverse consequences the petitioner may endure should
expunction be denied.201
Finally, the General Assembly could make the statute more administrable by
providing an alternative to prosecutorial consent for section 5 felony expungement.
For such petitions, the Assembly reserved the most stringent prerequisites: a
petitioner must wait for the later of ten years after her date of conviction or five years
after completing her sentence, and she must obtain written consent from the
prosecutor.202 While strict requirements may seem appropriate for expungement of
serious offenses, several Indiana prosecutors have sharply criticized the statute, and
it is unclear whether they would consent to expungement even if the petitioner
exhibits indicia of reform.203 This uncertainty raises concerns of unbalanced justice:
petitioners in progressive counties may find local prosecutors amenable to a second
chance, while persons convicted of identical crimes in hardline counties may face
strong resistance. To avoid this imbalance, the Assembly could authorize courts to
consider the input of family members, employers, and religious or community leaders
in lieu of prosecutorial consent.204 Such input might actually shed better light on the
petitioner’s particular circumstances versus a stamp of approval from the prosecutor,
who may have limited or no contact with the ex-offender after she reenters society.
B. Fairness
Aside from the practical considerations addressed in Part VI.A, the expungement
statute raises five normative concerns205: (1) it excludes from coverage the records
of children adjudicated as delinquent; (2) it limits relief and imposes an arbitrary
delay for persons arrested but not convicted; (3) it bases its waiting periods on
procedural circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control; (4) it sets an unreasonably
high bar for low-income petitioners burdened by court costs and restitution
obligations; and (5) it fails to grapple with the complex nature of rehabilitation
through its draconian “one-bite-at-the-apple” provision.
First, the General Assembly should amend the expungement statute to reach
adjudications of juvenile delinquency. Under current law, confidential police records
pertaining to delinquent children may be disclosed to a variety of officials and other

201. Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Iacino, 411 A.2d 754, 759 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)).
202. § 35-38-9-5(c), (e)(5) (Supp. 2014).
203. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (Shelby County Prosecutor Kent Apsley);
supra note 161 and accompanying text (Morgan County Prosecutor Steve Sonnega).
204. The Assembly could modify section 5(e)(5) to read as follows: “the prosecuting
attorney has consented in writing to the expungement of the person’s criminal records, or the
person has submitted adequate third-party testimony demonstrating that expungement would
best serve the interests of justice and equity.” The definition of “adequate” testimony could be
left to the discretion of the courts, or the Assembly could include a definitional provision
exemplifying presumptively adequate testimony.
205. Undoubtedly, critics may argue that the real normative concerns lie with expungement
itself—that the public has a right of access to criminal records and that rap-sheet stigma is
simply a consequence of law breaking. See supra Part II for an in-depth discussion of
expungement’s normative implications.
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parties, including “researchers” 206 and “interested persons.” 207 Similar provisions
allow for the release of otherwise confidential court records,208 and such records may
be released without a court order to the public upon the filing of a petition alleging
juvenile delinquency.209 Moreover, “[r]ecords relating to the detention of any child
in a secure facility shall be open to public inspection.”210 The juvenile expungement
provisions of title 31 offer some protection, but these provisions are entirely
discretionary. The juvenile court may grant or deny a petition based on its evaluation
of, inter alia, the “best interests of the child” and the “person’s current status.”211
These ambiguous standards, coupled with the ease with which “interested persons”
may obtain access to (and subsequently publicize) the records, create a substantial
risk that the errors of youth may follow reformed offenders into adulthood.212
Unfortunately, the new expungement statute offers little added protection—by its
terms, it does not reach final adjudications of juvenile delinquency. 213 Section 1

206. Upon requesting such records, a researcher must provide information about, inter alia,
the purpose of his project and the safeguards he will employ to protect the identity of his
subject. § 31-39-4-9 (2008).
207. This broad provision authorizes disclosure to any person having a “legitimate interest
in the work of the agency or in a particular case,” and it instructs the agency head to consider
that public safety is generally served if the public is informed about felonious acts or patterns
of less serious offenses. § 31-39-4-8(a) (2008). Public safety is an important goal, but so is
privacy—and it is difficult to grasp how this lenient statute affords any real protection to
former juvenile offenders, particularly since a “person having access to [these records] is not
bound by [confidentiality requirements] and may disclose the contents of the records.”
§ 31-39-4-8(b) (2008).
208. See §§ 31-39-2-10, -11 (2008).
209. The bar for such a petition is quite low: the court will release records if, for instance,
a petitioner alleges that a child age twelve or older has committed two acts that would be
misdemeanors if committed by adults. § 31-39-2-8 (2008).
210. § 31-39-3-3 (2008).
211. § 31-39-8-3 (2008). Even if a petitioner persuades the court to grant expungement,
the method employed under the juvenile records statute is troubling: the records may be
“destroyed or given to the person to whom the records pertain.” § 31-39-8-6 (2008). The latter
approach may give ex-offenders a “false sense of security, leading [them] to believe that no
trace of the record exists when, in fact, the records may continue to be available.” Carlton J.
Snow, Expungement and Employment Law: The Conflict Between an Employer’s Need to
Know About Juvenile Misdeeds and an Employee’s Need to Keep Them Secret, 41 WASH. U.
J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 24 (1992).
212. Concerns that youthful indiscretions may have a prolonged detrimental impact on
maturing adults have motivated lawmakers in other jurisdictions to pass “second chance” laws
targeted specifically at this vulnerable group. Such laws extend beyond criminal records. For
instance, California recently passed an “eraser button” statute that requires social media sites
with juvenile users to maintain a content deletion feature so that children can “remove
information that they posted and shouldn’t have.” James Steyer, Oops! Button Lets Kids
Remove Posts They Regret, CNN (Sept. 26, 2013, 10:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013
/09/26/opinion/steyer-california-eraser-button-law/.
213. See Kaarin M. Lueck, Expunging a Juvenile Record, IND. JUV. JUST. BLOG (Aug. 8,
2013, 6:25 AM), http://indianajuvenilejustice.com/2013/08/08/expunging-a-juvenile-record/
(confirming that juvenile expungement procedures are “different than the law that went into
effect July 1, 2013, which allows a person to expunge a criminal record under certain
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provides that juveniles whose arrests did not result in delinquency adjudications or
whose adjudications were vacated on appeal may benefit from expungement. Section
2 applies to final convictions—but of adult misdemeanors only.214 At a minimum,
the Assembly should amend the statute to extend equal expungement opportunities
for juvenile adjudications and comparable adult offenses.215 Better yet, the Assembly
should extend extra lenity to persons who acted out of impulse during the period
“between the idiocy of infancy and the folly of youth.”216 One attractive option might
be an automatic expungement scheme for lower-grade juvenile offenses, whereby
arrest and conviction records are systematically sealed after reformed ex-offenders
come of age.217 Another possibility might be a social media tool or web app that
walks users through the expungement process. Illinois has such a resource,
spearheaded by the Mikva Juvenile Justice Council.218
Second, the General Assembly should restore provisions of prior law that
authorized comprehensive expungement for persons arrested but not convicted.
Under chapter 5, arrestees who were not charged or whose charges were dropped due
to mistaken identity, no offense in fact, or lack of probable cause could petition for
expungement without delay: law enforcement agencies had a brief thirty-day window
to move in opposition.219 Under the 2011 statute, persons who were arrested and
charged with multiple offenses could qualify for restricted access to any dropped

circumstances”).
214. Curiously, the 2011 “restricted access” statute did provide relief for juveniles. See
§ 35-38-8-2 (Supp. 2011) (repealed 2013) (“This section applies [to] a person . . . adjudicated
a delinquent child for committing an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a
misdemeanor or Class D felony that did not result in injury to a person.”). But while the 2011
statute was abrogated in its entirety by the 2013 statute, the older juvenile expungement
provisions remain good law. The absurd result of this bifurcated approach is that a teenage
girl, X, who is adjudicated delinquent for engaging in disorderly conduct, must pin her hopes
on the good favor of a judge wielding broad discretion. Conversely, an adult man, Y, is entitled
to erase the record of such an offense after five years of good behavior.
215. Generally speaking, offenses that give rise to adjudications of juvenile delinquency
would be classified as misdemeanors or Class D felonies if committed by adults, and would
thus fall within the ambit of mandatory expungement. Children who commit more serious or
aggravated offenses are often waived into adult criminal court. See §§ 31-30-3-1 to -6 (2008).
216. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 36 (Stemmer House Publishers, Inc.
1978) (1911); see also State v. Guerrero, 120 P.2d 798, 802 (Ariz. 1942) (“The policy of the
juvenile law is to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them in the
graveyard of the forgotten past.”).
217. Florida maintains such a scheme: minors not classified as serious or habitual offenders
qualify for automatic expungement of many crimes five years after they turn nineteen, while
those classified as serious or habitual offenders qualify five years after turning twenty-one.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0515 (West 2006). Virginia has a similar scheme: the clerk of the
juvenile court is required to annually destroy the records of most lower-grade delinquency
adjudications for persons who have reached age nineteen if five years have elapsed since their
last hearing. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-306(A) (2010).
218. See Kaarin Lueck, Expunge.io, IND. JUV. JUST. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://indianajuvenilejustice.com/2014/02/20/expunge-io/ (discussing the app).
219. § 35-38-5-1(a), (d) (2008) (repealed 2014); cf. Ind. Metropolitan Police Dep’t v.
Prout, 10 N.E.3d 560, 563 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (recognizing that probable cause and the
other factors enumerated in chapter 5 are no longer relevant in expungement proceedings).
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charges. 220 And under the 2013 statute, persons arrested but not convicted could
qualify for the court, the BMV, the Department of Corrections, and the Indiana State
Police to seal records relating to their arrest.221
Conversely, under the 2014 amendments—which subsume all of the
abovementioned provisions—persons arrested but not convicted must (1) wait for
one year and then (2) seek expungement of arrest records located in “alphabetically
arranged criminal history information system[s].”222 Section 1 excludes expungement
of internal law enforcement records, court records, and records pertaining to pretrial
diversion—a baffling legislative choice given the broader relief of section 6.223 There
is little value in delaying relief for would-be petitioners who were never convicted
of the charges they seek to expunge.224 And there is no conceivable justification for
restricting low-grade expungement while offering ample relief to those convicted of
serious offenses. 225 In keeping with the general spirit of the new law—more

220. § 35-38-5-5.5 (Supp. 2011) (repealed 2013). A 2013 case, Lucas v. State, illustrated
the operation of the 2011 statute. 993 N.E.2d 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The petitioner in
Lucas had been charged with four crimes and one infraction stemming from a single arrest. Id.
at 1160. The petitioner negotiated these charges down to two misdemeanors; he then sought
to restrict access to records of the dropped charges. Id. The court of appeals found that the
petitioner was entitled to relief under the 2011 statute. Id. at 1162; see also Dave Stafford, Old
Expungement Law Applies to Dropped Charges in Plea Deal, COA Rules, IND. LAW. (Aug.
27, 2013), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/old-expungement-law-applies-to-droppedcharges-in-plea-deal-coa-rules/PARAMS/article/32246. However, the court also observed
that section 1 of the new statute—which took effect shortly before the Lucas opinion came
down—worked a “shift from focus on the disposition of individual charges to whether the
arrest ultimately resulted in a conviction.” Lucas, 993 N.E.2d at 1162. A close reading of
section 1 confirms the court’s interpretation: “This section applies only to a person who has
been arrested if . . . the arrest did not result in a conviction or juvenile adjudication . . . .”
§ 35-38-9-1(a) (Supp. 2014). In other words, had Lucas filed his petition after July 1, 2013, he
would not have qualified for relief.
221. § 35-38-9-1 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014).
222. § 35-38-9-1(f) (Supp. 2014).
223. Compare § 35-38-9-1(f)(2) (Supp. 2014) (requiring no “change or alteration” in the
records of any court in which charges were filed), with § 35-38-9-6(b) (Supp. 2014) (providing
that convicted petitioners may qualify for mandatory expungement of court records). Because
court records and records pertaining to pretrial diversion are published on such databases as
MyCase.In.Gov and Doxpop.com, as a practical matter, the lowest-level offenders may never
secure comprehensive relief under the new statute.
224. This is particularly so in cases of mistaken identity—which continue to plague the
criminal justice system in spite of advances in investigative technologies. See, e.g., Leah Hope,
Chesterton Man Wrongfully Accused of Selling Heroin, ABC7CHICAGO.COM (June 4, 2014),
http://abc7chicago.com/news/chesterton-man-wrongfully-accused-of-selling-heroin/93838/
(Northwest Indiana man spent ten days in jail and lost job after informant improperly identified
him in drug sting); Steve Jefferson, Attempted Murder Suspect Released After Mistaken Identity,
WTHR.COM (Dec. 13, 2013, 12:17 AM), http://www.wthr.com/story/24208836/2013/12/12
/assault-suspect-released-after-mistaken-identity-arrest (Indianapolis man spent holidays in jail
and lost possible job opportunity after victim improperly identified him as attacker).
225. The Board of Judges for the Monroe Circuit Court recognized the problem, writing in
a May 30, 2014, memorandum that while the Board had granted comprehensive relief to
qualifying petitioners under the previous version of chapter 9—expunging “all records of the

1356

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:1321

forgiveness and opportunity, fewer hurdles—the waiting period and the arbitrary
limitations of section 1 should be eliminated.226
Third, the General Assembly should consider starting the “clock” for the statutory
waiting periods at the date of arrest rather than the dates of conviction or sentence
completion. Such an adjustment would ensure equitable treatment for petitioners
whose trials are delayed due to no fault of their own. As in many states, delays are
endemic in Indiana’s clogged dockets.227 Starting the clock at the date of arrest would
make the process more consistent and fair.228
Fourth, the General Assembly should evaluate the efficacy of an expungement
process that requires full payment of all fines, fees, and court costs and satisfaction
of any restitution obligations.229 As discussed in Part I above, rap-sheet stigma has a
ruinous impact on the ability of ex-offenders to secure gainful employment and
achieve financial stability. Those fortunate reentrants who do find jobs have
drastically reduced earning power compared with their peers,230 and because certain

case, both locally and in state departments and repositories”—the Board could no longer
adhere to that practice given the changes in the law. HON. KENNETH G. TODD, BD. OF JUDGES,
MONROE CIRCUIT COURT, 2014 EXPUNGEMENT LAW 1 (2014). Instead, the Board concluded
that relief is now limited to petitioners who were actually arrested (versus those who were
cited or summoned into court) and may extend only to arrest records. Id. at 2. “[T]he amended
law now denies expungement relief to those who would rationally seem most deserving of
such a remedy.” Id. The Board predicted a “significant decrease in the volume of Section 1
petitioners in light of the more limited provisions of relief.” Id. at 3.
226. As amended in 2014, section 1 does allow for prosecutors to consent in writing to an
earlier petition. § 35-38-9-1(b). But rather than leaving the matter to the discretion of the adverse
party (the state), the Assembly should simply revise section 1 to authorize immediate relief where
charges are dropped, a defendant is found not guilty, or a conviction is overturned on appeal.
227. See In re Brown, 4 N.E.3d 619 (Ind. 2014) (per curiam) (removing superior court
judge from office after finding that her misconduct resulted in, inter alia, delays in processing
of pleadings and cases, delays in rulings, a five-month delay on a motion to dismiss, an
eleven-month delay on a motion to suppress, and ten delayed jail releases); Martin v. State,
984 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (reversing drunk driving conviction after unreasonable
182-day delay chargeable to the state); Indiana Man’s Triple-Murder Trial Begins After
Delays, WTHR.COM, Jan. 8, 2013, http://www.wthr.com/story/20528674/indiana-mans
-triple-murder-trial-begins-after-delays (murder trial commenced following five years of
delays). Unlike courts in most jurisdictions, Indiana courts do not permit so-called “Alford
pleas” of no contest; consequently, plea bargaining is less efficient in this state. See Carter v.
State, 739 N.E.2d 126, 128–29 (Ind. 2000) (“A valid guilty plea is a confession of guilt made
directly to a judicial officer and necessarily admits the incriminating facts alleged. A defendant
who says he did the crime and says he did not do the crime has in effect said nothing, at least
nothing to warrant a judge in entering a conviction.” (citation omitted)).
228. Such an adjustment need not undermine legislative intent: if the Assembly fears that
petitioners would qualify too soon, it can simply increase each waiting period accordingly
(e.g., nine years from the date of arrest rather than eight years from the date of conviction for
Class D / Level 6 felonies).
229. E.g., § 35-38-9-2(d)(3) (Supp. 2014).
230. A 2010 study by the Center for Economic and Policy Research found that in 2008,
36.6 percent of the male prison population had achieved less than a high school education.
JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH,
EX-OFFENDERS AND THE LABOR MARKET 6 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net
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classes of ex-offenders are excluded from government welfare programs, they have
lower spending power as well.231 With high unemployment prospects and an almost
comically inadequate minimum wage of $7.25, 232 it may prove impossible for
ex-offenders to repay the costs they incurred through their participation in the justice
system.233 The problem is exacerbated by a disconcerting trend in jurisdictions across
the nation whereby criminal defendants are facing unprecedented fines and fees. A
2014 exposé by National Public Radio, Guilty and Charged, found that “the costs of
the criminal justice system in the United States are paid increasingly by the
defendants,” a practice that “causes the poor to face harsher treatment than others
who commit identical crimes and can afford to pay.”234 In Indiana, where fees have
increased since 2010, defendants may be required to pay for the costs of, inter alia,

/documents/publications/ex-offenders-2010-11.pdf. Only 11.4% had completed any college.
Id. The study recited employment statistics showing that incarceration reduces ex-offenders’
average annual weeks of work by 9.7% for young white men and as much as 15.1% for young
black men. Id. at 9. Other statistics paint an even bleaker picture, suggesting that incarceration
may reduce annual weeks of work by between 13% and 23%. Id.
231. See, e.g., MARC MAUER & VIRGINIA MCCALMONT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A
LIFETIME OF PUNISHMENT: THE IMPACT OF THE FELONY DRUG BAN ON WELFARE BENEFITS 1
(2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/cc_A%20Lifetime%20of
%20Punishment.pdf (discussing statute that imposes lifetime ban on SNAP and TANF
benefits for felony drug offenders unless states opt out).
232. Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Minimum Wage Laws in the States,
DOL.GOV (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm#Indiana.
233. Hence a “pervasive cycle of arrest, incarceration, and reentry.” Leavitt, supra note
13, at 1281.
234. Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19,
2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the
-poor. NPR presented a series of anecdotes illustrating the drastic effects of fines and fees: in
one case, for instance, a homeless and unemployed driver was ticketed $165 for driving a
“defective vehicle”; the fine ballooned to $306 due to nonpayment, and the driver was arrested
and jailed the day before he was scheduled to begin working at Taco Bell. Id. Another
defendant, who was arrested in Augusta, Georgia, for stealing a can of beer, faced electronic
monitoring and probation management fees of more than $400 per month: since his only
income derived from his sale of plasma at a blood bank, he fell into arrears and was sent back
to jail. Id. One in five residents of Philadelphia had unpaid court bills in 2011, with a median
debt of $4500. Id. By one estimate, between eighty and eighty-five percent of ex-offenders
leave prison with incarceration-related bills. Id.
Escalating fines and fees have given rise to a collateral problem—the reemergence of de facto
debtors’ prisons. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,
667–68 (1983), that states that assess a fine or restitution as punishment for a crime “may not
thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the resources to pay it,” the Court left open
the possibility that states may imprison solvent convicts who willfully refuse to pay—and the
ambiguity surrounding the nature of willfulness has resulted in “sweeping discrepancies across the
country over how courts make those decisions.” Shapiro, supra. In Benton County, Washington,
for instance, a quarter of misdemeanor inmates on any given day are in jail because they failed to
timely pay their court costs. Joseph Shapiro, Supreme Court Ruling Not Enough to Prevent
Debtors Prisons, NPR (May 21, 2014, 5:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/313118629
/supreme-court-ruling-not-enough-to-prevent-debtors-prisons.
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electronic monitoring, probation or supervision, public defender services, and “room
and board” in prison.235
Although it is not atypical for state laws to require payment of costs and restitution
as a condition for expungement, some jurisdictions take a more pragmatic
approach.236 The General Assembly could revise Indiana’s expungement statute to
leave the question of full payment to the discretion of judges, who are in the better
position to consider the individual circumstances of each petitioner and to determine
whether indigence may warrant a degree of flexibility.
Finally, the Indiana General Assembly should amend the harsh “one-bite-at-theapple” provision. Under the 2013 law, this provision was a “poison pill”: it offered
no relief for pro se petitioners who made excusable errors in their pleadings.237 The
2014 amendments ensure that a petitioner whose pleadings were denied for
procedural reasons may seek subsequent relief, and they allow a judge to consider a
second petition for expungement if the petitioner neglected to include certain
convictions in his initial petition due to excusable neglect or circumstances beyond
his control.238 However, the general rule remains that a petitioner “may file a petition
for expungement only one (1) time during the petitioner’s lifetime.”239 Presumably, the
legislature was seeking to avoid a revolving door of crime-and-expungement.240 Yet
the waiting periods built into the statute suggest that career criminals are unlikely to

235. State-by-State Court Fees, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014
/05/19/312455680/state-by-state-court-fees.
236. In California, a guilty verdict may be set aside and all accusations dismissed in many
cases in which “a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of
probation, or has been discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation, or in any
other case in which a court, in its discretion and the interests of justice, determines that a
defendant should be granted [relief] . . . .” CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a)(1) (West Supp. 2014)
(emphasis added). Although costs are normally assessed for such a petition, ability to pay these
costs “shall be determined by the court . . . and shall not be a prerequisite to a person’s
eligibility . . . .” § 1203.4(d). In Washington, D.C., expungement is available for persons
convicted of “eligible” misdemeanors after an eight-year waiting period: the statute makes no
reference to fines or restitution. D.C. CODE § 16-803 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). In New Jersey,
where expungement is ordinarily available ten years after the payment of a court-ordered fine,
a court may grant earlier expungement if a petitioner “substantially complied with any
payment plan ordered . . . or could not do so due to compelling circumstances affecting his
ability to satisfy the fine.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-2(a)(1) (West Supp. 2014).
237. Maureen Hayden, Bill Seeks to Ease Indiana’s ‘Second Chance’ Law, GOSHEN NEWS
(Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.goshennews.com/local/x651203710/Bill-seeks-to-ease-Indianas
-second-chance-law/print.
238. IND. CODE § 35-38-9-9(h)–(j) (Supp. 2014).
239. § 35-38-9-9(h) (Supp. 2014).
240. The General Assembly may also have worried about the added cost of a new civil
action for ex-convicts. Obviously, expungement consumes judicial resources, and it may tie
up prosecutorial resources if the state challenges a petition. Some of the other
recommendations presented in this Note would help to streamline the process: for instance, by
eliminating prosecutorial consent and victim’s input requirements for mandatory
expungement, see supra Part VI.A, the Assembly could foreclose the necessity of hearings in
such cases. Moreover, to the extent that expungement imposes an added cost on courts, that
cost is mitigated by the added benefit to society when ex-offenders can secure housing and
employment without the stigma of a criminal record. See supra Part I.A.
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qualify.241 And while Indiana is not the only state with a one-time expungement policy,
other jurisdictions are more forgiving.242 The simplest solution would be to eliminate
the provision and rely on the waiting periods to prevent abuse. As an alternative, the
Assembly could draft language to require an additional waiting period—perhaps twice
the ordinary length—for petitioners who previously obtained expungement.
C. Effectiveness
1. Remedies
In its current form, the expungement statute makes bold assertions. It provides
that persons who suspend, expel, or refuse to employ anyone on the basis of an
expunged or sealed record commit “unlawful discrimination.”243 It requires employers
to ask about criminal records only in terms that exclude expunged offenses.244 It also
provides that persons who engage in discriminatory conduct commit infractions and
may be held in contempt.245
These penalties may have a deterrent effect, yet they are insufficient to restore the
rights of injured parties—and while the statute provides that a target of discrimination
is entitled to “injunctive relief,”246 such relief seems inadequate. Injunctions do not
foster collegial work relations; an applicant formerly targeted by a prejudiced manager
will not be too eager to join her team.247 There is an evidentiary problem as well: given

241. For example, a person convicted of a nonviolent Class C felony must generally wait
eight years from the completion of her sentence, and she must maintain a clean record
throughout those eight years. § 35-38-9-4(c), (e)(5) (Supp. 2014). Career criminals are
unlikely to satisfy this lengthy waiting period: they may never qualify for a single
expungement, let alone a series of expungements. But consider a Hoosier who commits a
minor indiscretion in his early twenties—such as vandalism or visiting a common nuisance—
and subsequently obtains expungement. If, in his forties, the Hoosier is charged with a DUI,
he will be precluded from expunging this offense even though he has lived an otherwise decent
life and even though there is no link between this offense and his earlier indiscretion.
Arguably, the “one-bite-at-the-apple” provision serves only to dissuade young people from
wiping the slate clean early in life—out of fear that they may run askance of the law decades
later. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:9(A)(5)(a) (Supp. 2014) (specifying that
expungement of a violation or misdemeanor offense other than OWI “shall occur only once
with respect to any person during a five-year period”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-105(4)–(6)
(LexisNexis 2012) (establishing a criminal history grid to determine whether a petitioner may
qualify for subsequent expungement).
243. § 35-38-9-10(b) (Supp. 2014).
244. § 35-38-9-10(d) (Supp. 2014).
245. § 35-38-9-10(f) (Supp. 2014).
246. See id.
247. On an analogous note, retaliation against workplace whistleblowers rose from twelve
percent in 2007 to twenty-two percent in 2011. Janice Harper, Hear the Lonesome Whistle Blow:
Workplace Retaliation, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/janice-harper/whisteblower-employers_b_1191737.html. Such retaliation is difficult to prove,
but it is deeply felt and may include such conduct as “receiving the cold-shoulder from
co-workers, being verbally abused by supervisors, and being relocated or demoted.” Id.
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stubborn jobless rates,248 employers are reviewing many applications and may reject a
candidate for any number of reasons. The candidate may suspect she has been targeted,
yet her suspicions alone will gain little traction in court.
Simple revisions to section 10 would render the statute more enforceable and thus
more effective. First, violations of subsection (d)—the requirement that employers
ask about criminal records only in terms that exclude expunged offenses—should
create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination under subsection (f).249 Then, if an
employer were to violate subsection (d), she would bear the burden to prove that her
violation was inadvertent or otherwise nondiscriminatory. This burden shift would
have a likely trickle-down effect: eager to avoid litigation, employers would exercise
greater care in evaluating and interviewing applicants.
Second, the General Assembly should amend subsection (f) to provide that victims
of discrimination are entitled to injunctive relief or, in the alternative, money
damages.250 A damages remedy would extend relief for persons who seek to vindicate
their rights but who no longer desire to work for prejudiced employers. Compensatory
damages might include job search expenses as well as court costs and legal fees.
Punitive damages would be appropriate if the discrimination was malicious or if
compensatory damages seemed unlikely to deter future discrimination.251
Third, the General Assembly should consider amending the civil rights
enforcement statute to cover discrimination on the basis of an expunged record.252
Such an amendment would bring rap-sheet discrimination within the jurisdiction of
the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, a body charged with investigating
discriminatory practices, taking action against employers who engage in such
practices, and restoring to the extent feasible the losses incurred by victims.253

248. Indiana’s unemployment rate in January 2015 reached six percent, an eleven-month
high—although as Department of Workforce Development Commissioner Steven Braun
noted, the higher numbers may indicate that more Hoosiers are reentering the workforce and
seeking employment. Brandon Smith, Indiana Unemployment Rises to Highest Level in 11
Months, IND. PUB. MEDIA (Mar. 17, 2015), http://indianapublicmedia.org/news/indiana
-unemployment-rises-highest-level-11-months-79493/.
249. Indiana’s Rules of Evidence stipulate that “the party against whom a presumption is
directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption.” IND. R. EVID. 301.
The remedy this Note is proposing is similar to the burden shift that occurs when a litigant
makes out a prima facie case of discrimination in the Title VII context. See Filter Specialists,
Inc. v. Brooks, 906 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ind. 2009).
250. A damages remedy was actually proposed in one of the bills introduced but not
enacted in the 117th General Assembly. See S.B. 407, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2011).
251. See Stroud v. Lints, 790 N.E.2d 440, 447 (Ind. 2003) (finding that “punitive damages
are intended both to deter others and to punish the wrongdoer”). In Indiana, punitive damages
must not exceed the greater of treble damages or $50,000, IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4 (2008), and
must be apportioned between the injured party (twenty-five percent) and the state’s violent
crime victims compensation fund (seventy-five percent), § 34-51-3-6 (2008).
252. The statute presently defines discriminatory conduct as an exclusion from equal
opportunity on the basis of “race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry.”
§ 22-9-1-3(l)(1) (2007).
253. § 22-9-1-6(d), (j) (2007).
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Finally, the General Assembly should consider earmarking the funds generated
from Class C infractions under subsection (f) for initiatives to combat discrimination
and to promote the rights of the reformed. Presently, these fines—up to $500 per
violation254—are simply deposited into the state’s general fund.255 This is a missed
opportunity.256 Fines could instead be deposited into a slush fund to cover the cost of
educational campaigns, public awareness broadcasts, training sessions for attorneys, or
reentry/antirecidivism programs aimed at helping ex-offenders make the most out of
their “second chance.” Funds could also be reserved to offset the cost of indigency
waivers available as of 2014 under section 33-37-3-2, or they could be deposited into
a dedicated account to provide free or subsidized counsel for low-income petitioners.257
2. Reach
Expungement is only meaningful if it actually relieves the ex-offender of
rap-sheet stigma. For expungement of most felonies, records remain public but are
marked to identify their status.258 Yet at this early stage, it is unclear to what extent,
if any, petitioners benefit from records “clearly and visibly marked or identified as
being expunged.” 259 Theoretically, this compromise serves the delicate dual
purposes of (1) maintaining public safety while (2) extending relief to qualified
petitioners who appear to have rehabilitated. But will employers and others in receipt
of such records actually treat the ex-offender “as if the person had never been
convicted of the offense?”260 Rap-sheet stigma is powerful.261 Even if an employer
knows the law and recognizes that she may not discriminate on the basis of an
expunged record, she may be subconsciously wary of an ex-offender. If many
employers behave in kind, the statute’s primary purpose will be thwarted. The
General Assembly could explore this problem by commissioning an interim study
committee: such a committee could conduct surveys, contact human resource

254. § 34-28-5-4(c) (2008).
255. § 34-28-5-5(c) (2008).
256. While general fundraising is an important governmental activity, Indiana’s budgetary
situation is enviably stable: the state ended its 2013 fiscal year with a $1.94 billion cash reserve, and
the General Assembly revoked certain “add-backs” that previously required Hoosiers to increase
their state taxable income (thereby paying more income tax). See Eric Bradner, Indiana Wraps Up
2013 Fiscal Year with $1.94B Surplus, THEINDYCHANNEL.COM (July 11, 2013, 10:37 PM),
http://www.theindychannel.com/news/politics/indiana-wraps-up-2013-fiscal-year-with-194b
-surplus; Indiana Add-Backs, IND. DEP’T REVENUE, http://www.in.gov/dor/4853.htm.
257. These recommendations are not too farfetched: in fact, there is precedent for
earmarking infraction fines under specific circumstances. See § 9-21-5-11(e) (2010)
(allocating funds from the violation of worksite speed limits to cover the costs of hiring
off-duty patrol officers); § 34-28-5-5(e) (2010) (allocating funds from traffic infractions in
Marion County for compensation of county commissioners and for funding the county’s
guardian ad litem program).
258. § 35-38-9-7(b) (Supp. 2014).
259. Id.
260. § 35-38-9-10(e) (Supp. 2014); cf. Graham Polando, Are Indiana’s Newly Expunged
Convictions Still Available for Impeachment?, 90 IND. L.J. SUPP. 30 (2014) (exploring whether
expunged convictions could be used in impeachment proceedings).
261. See supra Part I.

1362

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:1321

professionals, and poll courts to gather data on (1) which petitioners have sought
expungement, (2) whether they have qualified, and (3) how their circumstances have
changed subsequent to their petitions.262
The General Assembly should also explore mechanisms to combat the private
publication of expunged records. In a 2008 special concurrence, Judge Gordon
Shumaker of the Minnesota Court of Appeals wrote that to offer “eligible persons
the remedy of record expungement but then to limit the reach of that expungement
so that the record remains accessible to the public is to effectively deny that remedy.
This contradiction surely violates the principle of fundamental fairness on which our
laws are premised.”263 Shelby County Prosecutor Kent Apsley echoed these concerns
in an August 2013 interview: “Once a person has been charged, convicted and that
information hits the World Wide Web, there is no way to cover up those facts.”264
Granted, no effort to preserve privacy will be absolutely effective, but one need
not resort to such defeatism. Indeed, the 2014 amendments introduced an important
change: the contents of a petition for expungement and an order granting
expungement are now confidential.265 But as Jeffrey Weise at the Division of State
Court Administration pointed out, the amendment does not make the entire civil case

262. The added cost and administrative burden of convening interim study committees
must, of course, be taken into account. See § 2-5-1.2-11 (Supp. 2014) (establishing a right to
compensation for service on committees); § 2-5-1.2-14 (Supp. 2014) (designating funds for
committee expenses). Even so, each summer and fall, the General Assembly convenes a
variety of these committees to evaluate important issues in preparation for the next legislative
session. See, e.g., 2013 Interim Study Committees, IND. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://www.in.gov/legislative/interim/committee/. During the last recess, committees met to
discuss, inter alia, child care, driver education, compensation of public officers, and the state
fair. Id. The impacts of a key criminal records statute seem to warrant at least as much scrutiny
as these other matters.
263. State v. V.A.J., 744 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (Shumaker, J.,
concurring specially), abrogated by State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 2008).
264. Gable, supra note 158; cf. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107–08
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Publication of the names of juvenile
offenders may seriously impair the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and
handicap the youths’ prospects for adjustment in society and acceptance by the public. This
exposure brings undue embarrassment to the families of youthful offenders and may cause the
juvenile to lose employment opportunities . . . . Such publicity also renders nugatory States’
expungement laws, for a potential employer or any other person can retrieve the information
the States seek to ‘bury’ simply by visiting the morgue of the local newspaper.” (citations
omitted)); Adam Liptak, Criminal Records Erased by Courts Live To Tell Tales, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2006, at A1 (“[E]normous commercial databases are fast undoing the societal bargain
of expungement, one that used to give people who had committed minor crimes a clean slate
and a fresh start.”).
265. § 35-38-9-10(i) (Supp. 2014). In August 2014, Indiana’s public access counselor, Luke
Britt, opined that expungement petitions are not governed by the state’s Open Door Law. As a
result, journalists can be lawfully denied access to courtrooms while expungement proceedings
are underway. See Brian Culp, Public Access Counselor OKs Closed Hearings on Expungement,
HERALDTIMESONLINE.COM (Aug. 24, 2014, 11:10 PM), http://www.heraldtimesonline.com
/public-access-counselor-oks-closed-hearings-on-expungement/article_8808fd5b-dabe-5cc3
-ad3d-12054ba288d7.html.
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confidential,266 and it does not affect the status of records previously published on
the Internet. An addendum to section 6(a)(2) could require the Central Repository to
notify prior recipients that an expunged record has been withdrawn from the public
domain. The Assembly could also contemplate liability for publishers who
knowingly report on an expunged offense without indicating in some way the fact of
expungement. Obviously, such a rule would require narrow tailoring to avoid a First
Amendment violation; 267 the precise composition of any such rule is beyond the
scope of this Note.268
Finally, the General Assembly should consider how it might harness
expungement to accomplish other legislative priorities. For instance, the Assembly
should consider an accelerated expungement scheme for petitioners who demonstrate
an exceptional dedication to volunteerism. The Assembly could add a caveat to the
waiting periods, allowing judges to override them for such petitioners. Alternatively,
the Assembly could create a new service-and-mentorship program, enabling
ex-offenders to earn “credits” toward the waiting periods akin to “early release”

266. See Oddi, supra note 121.
267. Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny: they must be “(1)
necessary to serve a (2) compelling state interest and (3) narrowly drawn.” LaRose v. State,
820 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Yet strict scrutiny is not “fatal in fact,” and it may
be possible for the General Assembly to craft legislation in such a narrow manner that it can
prevent discrimination against reformed ex-offenders—surely an important governmental
interest and arguably a compelling one—while preserving the First Amendment rights of
Internet publishers.
268. Although this Note does not purport to predict whether such a rule could withstand
constitutional scrutiny, it is worth noting that courts have long recognized tort liability for
certain disclosures of private facts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
Moreover, the General Assembly has restricted publication of confidential information in a
variety of circumstances. E.g., § 5-14-3-4 (2010) (protection of private information held by
administrative agencies); § 6-1.1-35-9 (2010) (protection of certain financial information in
the context of property assessments); § 16-39-2-3 (2008) (protection of mental health records).
While rejecting the argument that publishers must erase content about expunged arrest
records, Professor Eugene Volokh entertained the notion that publications should be updated
if charges are dropped. For entities that refuse to update their publications, liability might
attach on a theory of “libel by omission.” Eugene Volokh, Is It Libel To Say Someone Was
Arrested When the Arrest Record Has Been Erased?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 8, 2012,
5:45 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/08/08/is-it-libel-to-say-someone-was-arrested-when
-the-arrest-record-has-been-erased/. Indiana does not generally recognize such a theory, but
recovery may lie if “what has been omitted has made a material assertion of fact untrue.” Heeb
v. Smith, 613 N.E.2d 416, 422–23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). One could argue that reporting on an
offense without noting the fact of expungement is materially deceptive: in fact, concern about
such deception underlies the updated trade regulations discussed in note 148, supra.
In a 2010 article, communications expert Clay Calvert offered an interesting (though
perhaps unrealistic) alternative to legislative resolution of the expungement / First Amendment
conflict: an ethical standard requiring journalists who report on arrests and convictions to
report on subsequent expungements and to explain their legal significance. Clay Calvert
& Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes with the First Amendment and
Online Journalism: Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the Digital Age?, 19 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 123, 143–44 (2010). Calvert’s recommendation would not eliminate
discrimination, but it might offer a modest safeguard.
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procedures.269 Not only would a service program encourage prosocial behavior, it
would also meet an important need270 while expediting relief for persons who seem
particularly deserving.
CONCLUSION
Indiana’s expungement law has transformed during the space of three short years
from a stingy scheme into a generous one. This transformation is changing lives. In
December 2013, for instance, a Gary woman learned that her son would qualify for
expungement under the new statute. “Hallelujah!” she declared. “This shows there’s
always another chance for a new beginning.”271
The project is not complete. Important work lies ahead for the General Assembly
and the courts as they seek to fashion a law that is just and fair. Its contours must be
shaped; its implications must be evaluated and litigated. This process will take time.
But if expungement continues to enjoy bipartisan support, and if the legal
community continues to participate in this endeavor, the Hoosier state may realize
the vision that Governor Pence declared, becoming “the best place, once you’ve done
your time, to get a second chance.”272

269. See, e.g., § 35-50-6-3.3 (2008) (providing credit time for completion of educational
coursework, vocational training, and substance abuse recovery programming).
270. Private organizations have long acknowledged the unique perspective that
ex-offenders can offer and the compelling manner in which they can connect with urban youth
and other at-risk groups that may be distrustful of conventional authority figures. See, e.g.,
Patrick Boyle, Ex-Convicts Connect with Kids, YOUTHTODAY (Mar. 1, 2001),
http://youthtoday.org/2001/03/ex-convicts-connect-with-kids/; Beth Warren, Former
Chicago Gang Supervisor with Violent History Now Mentors Memphis Youths, COM. APPEAL
(MEMPHIS) (Mar. 14, 2013, 11:54 PM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/local-news
/former-chicago-gang-supervisor-with-violent-now. The U.K. Ministry of Justice has
implemented a more universal approach, recruiting ex-offenders to be “‘wise friends’ to
newly-freed prisoners.” James Slack, Ex-Criminals Will Become Mentors to Newly-Freed
Prisoners and Offer Tips on How to Go Straight, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 19, 2012, 7:03 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2235508/Ex-criminals-mentors-newly-freed-prisoners
-offer-tips-straight.html.
271. Michael Gonzalez, Second Chance Law Offers a Fresh Start, POST-TRIB. (Dec. 21,
2013, 12:44 AM), http://posttrib.suntimes.com/news/lake/24501799-418/second-chance-law
-offers-a-fresh-start.html.
272. Weidenbener, supra note 7.

